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 The problem of global climate change (GCC) is one which requires a global 
response if it is to be adequately addressed. The issue itself is one which cuts across 
disciplines, capturing aspects of the natural sciences, the social sciences and the 
humanities. The interdisciplinary nature of GCC contributes to the difficulty in finding a 
response which is both effective and agreeable to the practitioners of the multiple 
disciplines (Gardiner 2004, p. 556). The result has been a mixed response from different 
disciplines. The natural and social sciences have taken the lead on the topic, exploring it 
in all of its physical, economic, and social complexity. Curiously, the attention of the 
ethicists has not been nearly as substantial as that from the other disciplines. Gardiner 
(2004) has made a considerable effort in summarizing the issue through an ethical lens 
and both Traxler (2002) and Singer (2002) have both proposed their own responses to the 
issue but there is little beyond these efforts.  
 It is also surprising that those ethical theories which have been advanced are 
largely pragmatic in nature. They are often more concerned with what response will 
garner the widest support or result in the least likelihood of defection. I do not find these 
approaches satisfactory. Looking out into the sea of research that has been done on 
climate change, I do not see a marker for a purely ethical response, one unencumbered by 
the demands of practical necessity. I am not so naïve as to think that a purely ethical 
approach has a strong likelihood of being put into practice, but knowing what such an 
approach would look like would have considerable advantage for other approaches. The 
first advantage is that it sets a goalpost against which other approaches can be compared. 
If we continue to produce approaches which are made of some amount of ethics 
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measured against some degree of practicality it is difficult to know exactly how far from 
the shore of ethics we are if we have never laid eyes upon it. Having seen it, we can 
weigh a combined, practical-ethical approach and make an informed choice regarding the 
balance which it strikes.  
This method of approach follows a traditional distinction in ethics between ideal 
and non-ideal theories.1 The distinction, most simply stated, is between a theory which 
assumes ideal conditions such that all actors will act in a perfectly ethically manner. 
Practical considerations are not the concern of such a theory. The alternative is that which 
takes into consideration the practical concern of how to motivate the actors to comply 
with such a theory. Under this approach concessions to the ideal theory are made in 
consideration of the ethical imperfection of the actors.2 Rawls (1971) comments on the 
usefulness of ideal theory, saying, “Obviously the problems of [non-ideal] theory are the 
pressing and urgent matters. These are the things that we are faced with in everyday life. 
The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for 
the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems.” (p. 8) 
 The second motivation for creating a purely ethical or idealized approach is in 
response to the fatalism which is so frequently present when discussing our social, 
economic, and political institutions. There is a prevailing myth that, somehow, these 
creations of ours will themselves create the best outcome for humanity without our 
thoughtful intervention. We need not be slaves to the institutions that we create, we are 
                                                 
1 This distinction goes by a number of different names. For example, Rawls (1971) uses the terms strict 
compliance theory and partial compliance theory (p. 8). I am using ideal and non-ideal as I feel they are the 
most clear for the non-specialist reader.  
2 More broadly, discussions of just punishment and war fall under the heading of non-ideal theory because 
in an idealized theory there is no need for such measures. For my purposes, however, the most useful 
distinction between the two approaches is in regard to motivation. An ideal theory, such as the one I am 
advancing, does not make concessions to how to motivate nations or individuals to respond to GCC. A non-
ideal theory would consider how to justly motivate people or nations to address GCC.  
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their masters and we must decide for ourselves what is right and how we will bring about 
the best society. This claim is in no way revolutionary, it is merely meant to emphasize 
the agency that we hold over our social arrangements. All too often is there a systemic 
sense of despair when discussing social arrangements, a sense that nothing other than 
“what is” will ever be possible. An idea, perhaps a better term is an ideal, should not be 
hampered in its infancy by practical limitations. Of course, if there is any hope for its 
realization, practical considerations must be introduced at some point, but the value of 
ethical imagination, unencumbered by practical limitations, must be realized and 
appreciated. If we feel that the social system that is currently in place is not satisfying us, 
if it is not right according to our metric, we must be willing to imagine its alternatives if 
we ever want to move beyond it. 
 Ultimately, however, a non-ideal theory which deals with matters of compliance 
is needed as compliance is, perhaps, the single greatest hurdle in addressing GCC as the 
incentives are clearly set so as to encourage inaction. In agreement with the above quote 
from Rawls, however, an understanding of the ideal theory is needed before a reasonable 
account of non-ideal theory can be put into place. In my language, we need to see the 
shore to know how far we are from it.  
 The approach I take in my attempt at a purely ethical approach to addressing GCC 
is to first ask what it is we need to do and then to ask how it is we should go about doing 
that. It is a two stage process with the ultimate goal of developing a measure of obligation 
which can then be applied to a practical method of addressing GCC. The approach 
categorically favors simplicity over complexity. If there is a simple, intuitive solution to a 
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question, it is taken, with justification, to be correct until relevant information demands 
moving away from it.  
 This paper is, like the problem itself, interdisciplinary and seeks to be interesting 
and accessible to all readers, despite their background. Thus, specialized language is 
avoided where possible and defined where necessary.  
 Global climate change is not an easy problem to address, but the scope of the 
challenge does not warrant our aversion. There is an incredible challenge facing the 
world, one that will not only remain present but will get markedly worse if it is not 
addressed head on. Let us not be afraid of a problem which is of our own making. 
 
2. The Problem of Global Climate Change
The near consensus in the scientific community is that humans are having a direct 
and significant influence on the climate systems of the earth. The changes which are 
predicted to result from global climate change have the potential to harm multitudes of 
people in myriad ways. While an increase in mean surface air temperature by 2°C sounds 
innocuous, this increase is likely to disrupt precariously balanced natural systems in ways 
that pose the greatest danger to humans. Sea levels will rise as a result of thermal 
expansion and run-off from ice caps,3 inundating coastal regions, submerging entire 
island nations and depriving people of their land (IPCC 2001a, p. 667). As climate 
patterns change there is the likelihood for massive crop failures as the climate becomes 
unsuitable for the traditional crops grown in a region (IPCC 2001b, p. 253). Disease-
carrying insects will be able to survive in new regions, bringing their dengue fever, 
                                                 
3 A more significant and less predictable cause for sea-level rise is the collapse of polar ice sheets and 
shelves.  
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malaria and schistosomiasis to human populations that do not have a history of resistance 
to the disease and do not have the knowledge or means to respond to such a situation 
(Hopp and Foley 2001). The process was originally referred to as “global warming.” But 
it is much more than that: it is a disruption to some of the earth’s most fundamental 
natural systems4 which will, in turn, lead to significant disruptions to the human systems 
which inhabit the earth. While certain authors may argue for attention to be given to GCC 
on the grounds of protecting the intrinsic value of these natural systems, here I am 
making no such claim. GCC is a humanitarian crisis which will further stress the people 
of the world who are already bent over by the heavy burden of low development. 
GCC presents a double threat to the least developed countries (LDCs) of the 
world. First, there is empirical evidence that the inhabitants of LDCs fare worse in 
response to natural disasters, other factors held equal (Kahn 2005, p. 283). Second, the 
impacts of GCC are likely to be most severe in the tropics where many LDCs are located 
while temperate climes and their well-developed inhabitants are likely to receive a less 
severe blow (Gardiner 2004, p. 563). The implications of this situation are staggering. 
GCC threatens to undo the progress of the past and impede the progress of the future in 
bringing the LCDs up to a respectable level of development. Simply put, it is a 
catastrophe waiting to happen, a crisis on which we have predicted and now have the 
opportunity to act or to simply ignore.  
If GCC does pose a significant threat of creating or exacerbating humanitarian 
crises in the future (a condition widely supported in the scientific literature), then an 
                                                 
4 These systems include the water resources, agricultural capabilities, terrestrial and freshwater resources, 
and other systems which have been deemed vulnerable to the impacts of GCC. For an exhaustive review of 
these impacts, see the IPCC report from Working Group II (2001b), especially its summary for policy 
makers. 
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intervention on these basic humanitarian grounds finds almost universal support among 
ethicists. Regardless of what an ethicist may think about the claims of international 
justice, there is a basic humanitarian duty to prevent catastrophe when possible and 
provide aid when needed. Thomas Nagel, in “The Problem of Global Justice,” remarks: 
[J]ustice may be a side issue. Whatever view one takes of the applicability 
or inapplicability of the standards of justice to [the income disparity 
present in the world], it is clearly a disaster from a more broadly 
humanitarian point of view. I assume there is some minimal concern we 
owe to fellow human beings threatened with starvation or severe 
malnutrition and early death from easily preventable disease, as all these 
people in dire poverty are (118).  
The duty to address GCC is uncontroversial from a moral perspective. If we know, with 
relative certainty, that a situation is going to greatly threaten the basic well-being of any 
person (in this case, many persons) then there is a clear moral duty to act to prevent that 
situation. This duty is based on the minimal concern which is owed to our fellow humans. 
If nothing else, it is plainly wrong to allow a person to starve, die of a disease, or drown 
when there is the opportunity to prevent it, especially when the cost of that prevention is 
relatively small. Simply put, the duty to do something about GCC is not a matter of 
justice, but a matter of humanitarian assistance.  
 It is important to recognize that the humanitarian crisis of GCC is of a particular 
sort which makes for an even stronger case to address it directly and forcefully. Certain 
crises are the result of natural disasters which are clearly not caused by human actions,5 
                                                 
5 Though, at times, human activities can exacerbate the harm caused by natural disasters. For example, 
cutting corners when engineering buildings on or near geologic faults can greatly increase the damage 
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while others are the direct result of human actions. There is a distinction drawn between 
the responses to each. Responding to the purely natural disaster implies “positive duties” 
to the people suffering the crisis whereas responding to the anthropogenic crisis simply 
implies “negative duties” to the people suffering.6 Whereas some critics are skeptical 
about the existence of any positive duties, no one who holds any ethical framework 
denies the existence of negative duties to not do harm. The duty to address climate 
change is ethically fundamental, finding support in even the most austere ethical theories. 
A relevant distinction to be made between GCC and other humanitarian crises is 
that the most severe impacts of GCC have yet to be felt.7 Whereas the response to famine 
and disease is largely reactive, responding to the problem after the point at which it is 
plainly a problem, there is a question of whether to respond to GCC proactively or 
reactively. In truth, we have already committed ourselves to some degree of climate 
change and its ensuing impacts and thus any response to climate change will have to 
include some amount of reaction to the problems once they occur. In the parlance of 
climate change, reaction to the impacts is dubbed “adaptation” and proactive measures to 
minimize such impacts are dubbed “mitigation.”  
As Gardiner (2004) observes, the debate to adapt or mitigate is largely based 
around questions of cost, questioning which approach will be the least cost option. The 
modeling required to make such estimates of cost is extremely sensitive to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
caused by natural disasters. These situations also call for attention of the sort which I am advocating for 
GCC.  
6 A positive duty to a person is one which requires others to do something for that person, simply on the 
grounds that they are in need, without consideration of why they are suffering. A negative duty simply 
requires that you do not harm that person. Thus a negative duty is constructed in the negative form, “Do not 
harm,” whereas the positive duty is constructed as, “Provide assistance to those in need.”  
7 There is suspicion, reported widely in the popular media, that the abnormally intense 2005 hurricane 
season is a result of GCC. Thus, a resident of the United States Gulf Coast may understandably object to 
this statement. 
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assumptions which are built into it. Bjorn Lomborg, inspired by the modeling work of 
William Nordhaus and an ardent opponent to mitigation, holds that the expense of 
mitigation can be better spent on other causes. Gardiner describes the Nordhaus model 
which Lombord sites as “controversial,” in its estimates, others have been far less kind. 
Stephen Schneider (1993) remarks that the estimates used to calculate the cost of 
reduction are “draconian.” Schneider, with Christian Azar (2001), conclude that “even 
the most pessimistic economic model results also support the conclusion that substantial 
reductions in carbon emissions and several fold increases in economic welfare are 
compatible targets (original emphasis).” Figure 1 illustrates the difference in global GDP 
under a “business as usual” (BAU) atmospheric carbon stabilization schemes of  
Figure 1: Global income trajectories under business as usual (BAU) and in the case of stabilizing the 
atmosphere at 350ppm, 450ppm, and 550ppm. (Source: Azar and Schneider 2002) 
increasing concentrations. According to this more respected approach, the economic 
consequences of mitigation, even at the conservative level of 350ppm8, are certainly not 
                                                 
8 This level has been recently made impossible to achieve as present concentrations are now above this 
mark. 
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prohibitive to the economic expansion which is so vitally important to both politicians 
and their constituents. 
Gardiner also makes the observation that that adapting to the incremental 
economic changes imposed by mitigation is to be preferred to adapting to the highly 
unpredictable and unevenly distributed of GCC left unchecked. We can do nothing and 
respond on the consequences wrought by Mother Nature at the time and place of her 
choosing, or we can attempt to mitigate such impacts via the mechanism of our choosing, 
dividing the burdens as we choose.  This is a cogent point which captures both the 
practical and economic advantages of mitigation over adaptation. What does it take to 
mitigate the consequences of climate change? The simple answer is a reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Due to the nature of the climate system, however, it is not as 
simple as may first seem to be the case. In order to choose a mitigation pathway, it is 
necessary to first choose a final atmospheric concentration of CO2. This choice is 
governed by what range of predicted temperature increase is acceptable. In order to avoid 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system which is the stated 
purpose of these attempts (UNFCCC 1992)9, studies have shown that something around a 
2ºC increase in mean surface temperature is the upper limit of what can be tolerated10 
(e.g. Schneider and Mastrandrea 2005). In order to commit ourselves to no more than a 
2ºC increase, further studies have shown that stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of 
CO2 at or around 550ppm is necessary (e.g. Eickhout et al. 2003, p. 41). Stabilization at 
that concentration does not follow a simple linear approach, but an approach which 
                                                 
9 “Article 2, Objective: The ultimate objective of this Convention…is to achieve…stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.” 
10 The 2ºC upper limit is also what has been adopted by the European Union for their purposes in GCC 
mitigation. 
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Figure 2: Stabilization scenarios for atmospheric CO2 and the corresponding equilibrium changes 
in global mean temperature as compared to pre-industrial times (Source: Azar and Rodhe 1997) 
increases and then stabilizes, as shown in Figure 2. Thus, at different points on the 
progression toward stabilization, different amounts of greenhouse gases can be emitted 
globally.  
 
3. What to Do About It? 
While the claim that we must do something about GCC may be ethically 
uncontroversial, deciding how to address GCC is quite the opposite. Even narrowing the 
focus to mitigation does little to quiet the debate. It would seem that the number of 
proposals on how to mitigate is as numerous as the people who have thought about the 
issue.11 The proposals have come from both ethicists and social scientists capturing both 
the arguments from moral duty and those from practical necessity. The conditions which 
can be imagined in an ethically ideal world are seldom aligned with the political, 
                                                 
11 Of course, my writing of this paper only goes to further support this assertion. 
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economic and social reality of our inhabited world. Thus, there is a sense that the moral 
perspectives are irrelevant and ought to be written off for being simply impractical. As I 
have stated above, I firmly believe this is not the case and we must not dissuade ourselves 
from a moral arrangement simply because it would be difficult to achieve. If this position 
is naïve, then so be it, I am certain that it is necessary for there to be any progress in our 
global human systems. 
To begin, I will briefly review proposals for mitigation systems which are 
relevant to my discussion. Daniel Bodansky’s review, International Climate Efforts 
Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches has been an indispensable resource for this section 
and, naturally, provides a far more thorough review of more than 40 approaches. I have 
selected a few which characterize the broad categories of approaches. In discussing these 
examples I am primarily interested in how they divide the burdens of mitigation among 
the people of the world. Many have a significant focus on the policy mechanisms 
required to enact their proposal and the methods necessary for its implementation and 
enforcement. This, however, is not my primary concern; I am principally concerned with 
the division of burdens entailed with mitigation of climate change impacts. I have 
attempted to distinguish those proposals which are coming from an ethical perspective 
and those which are coming from a scientific or political perspective, though there is 
some overlap where others from both disciplines have proposed the same or similar 
approaches (e.g. equal per capita burden sharing). For those which have been advanced 
from both perspectives I will remark on their shared support and place them in what I 
take to be the most appropriate category. In this section I will simply be describing the 
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approaches as objectively as possible, leaving analysis of their positive and negative 
attributes for a later section. 
 
3.1 Proposals from social, political, and naturall scientists 
The Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change is at once 
celebrated for what it has accomplished and denigrated for what it has left unfinished. 
Created at the third Conference of Parties (COP-3) in Kyoto, Japan, the Protocol aimed to 
set specific commitments for the nations of the developed world (the members of its 
Annex B). The process which created the Protocol is what Bodansky categorizes as a top-
down multilateral negotiation with an ad hoc division of commitments. The Protocol is 
celebrated for being the first agreement with specific commitments for various nations. 
Unfortunately for the Protocol, the praise stops shortly thereafter. Though it is a 
significant first step in the process, showing that nations can come to some agreement on 
emission reductions, it is widely criticized on many fronts. Robert Stavins (forthcoming) 
summarizes the current debate on the Protocol well, saying: 
Because the Kyoto Protocol’s ambitious targets apply only to the short 
term (2008-2012) and only to industrialized nations, the agreement will 
impose relatively high costs and generate only modest short-term benefits 
while failing to provide a real solution (Joseph E. Aldy et al. 2003). For 
these reasons, most economists see the agreement as deeply flawed 
(Richard N. Cooper 1998; David G. Victor 2001; Warwick J. McKibbin 
and Peter J. Wilcoxen 2002), although some see it as an acceptable first 
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step (Axel Michaelowa 2003). Virtually all agree, however, that the 
Protocol is not sufficient to the overall challenge. 
 Regarding the process followed to come to the reduction commitments listed in 
Annex B of the document Najam (1998) describes it as a combination of, “political 
horse-trading, power asymmetries at the negotiating table and the desire to obtain 
commitments from all Annex-I parties.12” It is this process which leads Bodansky to 
categorize the division of commitments as “ad hoc”. The alternative in his summary is 
the “rational design of commitments” whereby commitments would not be divided 
through negotiation, but according to some relevant criteria instead.  
 The end result of the Kyoto Protocol was a set of commitments among Annex-I 
countries which varied from nation to nation. For example, the United States committed 
itself to reducing its carbon emissions to 93% of its 1990 emissions during the 2008-2012 
commitment period. Many of the member states to the European Union agreed to 
reductions of 92% of their 1990 levels, while other nations were allowed and agreed to 
increase their emissions. Australia has set a limit of 108% of 1990 emissions and Iceland 
has set a limit at 110% of 1990 emissions.  
The Brazilian Proposal was a proposed change to the Kyoto Protocol brought by 
the Brazilian delegation during the COP-3 negotiations. The Brazilian Proposal aimed to 
accomplish two tasks. The first was to formalize the process by which non-Annex-I 
                                                 
12 The references to nations as belonging to different Annexes can easily become confusing. The distinction 
originated in the UNFCCC (1992) with its listing of nations in its Annex I and Annex II. Nations listed in 
Annex I are the developed nations of the world, including those nations in transition to a market economy 
(primarily the newly-independent states of the former Soviet Union). The list of Annex II nations starts 
with the nations on the Annex I list and removes the nations with transitional economies. Discussion of 
Annex B nations refers to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (1997) which lists the nations with specific 
reduction commitments under the Protocol. This list is nearly interchangeable with the Annex I list from 
the original UNFCCC.  
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nations would be included in the Kyoto process. The second was an attempt to distribute 
commitments based on each nation’s historical emissions and, later, each nation’s 
contribution to mean surface temperature increase. Thus, it is an example of Bodansky’s 
rational design of commitments.  
The Brazilian Proposal was not adopted during the COP-3 negotiations, but it has 
become noteworthy because it is “the sole climate regime for differentiation of 
commitments, with formal discussion and documentation status within UNFCCC” (Den 
Elzen 2005, p. 278). Since the original proposal was brought in 1997, numerous expert 
meetings have occurred to weigh the scientific methods and ability to support the 
calculations required by the proposal. Throughout these meetings numerous indicators of 
responsibility were discussed and subsequent studies have determined that the level of 
uncertainty is acceptably low among Annex-I countries for the Brazilian Proposal to be 
implemented (Den Elzen 2002, p. 66). A more full discussion of the Brazilian Proposal 
and its considerations occurs later in this paper. 
An alternative to dividing commitments according to a nation’s historical 
contribution to GCC, as is the case in the Brazilian Proposal, is to divide commitments 
according to each nation’s Ability to Pay. Under the system proposed by Jacoby et al. 
(Bodansky 2004), nations would be divided into different classes based on per capita 
GDP. Each class of nations would then have commitments of varying strictness which 
they would be expected to meet (Bodansky 2004). This approach is similar to the 
Brazilian Proposal in many ways. It can also be considered a method of rational design of 
commitments. The primary difference between this approach and that outlined in the 
Brazilian Proposal is that this method is “forward-looking,” whereas the Brazilian 
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Proposal is “backward-looking”. It is a difference of who is responsible for causing the 
problem and who is best suited to resolve the problem. This difference is of particular 
concern to the ethicists below. 
The Bottom-Up approach eschews not only the rational design of commitments 
but the international negotiation process as well. This alternative approach would allow 
states to define for themselves their commitments and the means by which they would 
meet their commitments. Nations could then engage in bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations in order to determine a package of actions which would be acceptable to all 
members party to the negotiation. The central aim of this approach is to give the 
individual nations the opportunity to design for themselves what is most practical given 
their social, political, economic and environmental needs. This approach was proposed by 
Robert A. Reinstein in 2004 (Bodansky 2004).  
A far more comprehensive approach is constructed in the South-North Dialogue 
on Equity in the Greenhouse. This team-based approach sought to draw from previous 
proposals to come to one approach which would adequately and equitably address GCC. 
The team defines an adequate response to GCC to be preventing any increase in global 
mean surface temperature greater than 2ºC. Defining equity is a bit more complicated, as 
is often the case. The team defines four broad themes of equity in GCC: the division of 
burdens brought on by mitigation, the impacts of climate change and the need to adapt 
equitably, the capacity of nations to engage politically in the discussions and negotiations 
surrounding GCC, and the way in which intranational inequity reflects international 
inequity in regards to GCC (Ott et al. 2004).  
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The South-North Dialogue is particularly noteworthy because of its scope and 
breadth. It attempts to address not only the commitments required by each nation but the 
process used to determine those commitments. The main  push of the proposal is to place 
nations into one of six categories; Annex-I countries, Annex-I but not Annex-II countries 
(i.e., nations undergoing a transition to a market economy), newly industrialized 
countries, rapidly industrializing countries, other developing countries, and least 
developed countries. The member states of each category would then have varying 
commitments to mitigate and to provide adaptive assistance. The team of experts 
assessed each nation according to three parameters: responsibility for GCC, capability to 
mitigate, and potential to mitigate. Responsibility for GCC is measured via cumulative 
carbon emissions from 1990 until 2000, capability is measured via the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and per capita GDP, and potential to mitigate is defined via a 
combination of emissions per unit GDP, emissions per capita, and emissions growth 
rate13 (Ott et al. 2004, p. 3; Bodansky 2004).  
3.2 Proposals from philosophers and ethicists 
 One important remark before reviewing these approaches is that there has not 
been a considerable amount of focus on GCC specifically as an issue of ethics. Gardiner 
(2004) remarks at the close of his essay, “Philosophical clarity [on the issue] is urgently 
needed,” calling the current state of understanding “a call to arms” for moral 
philosophers. Despite the relatively short supply of philosophical and ethical proposals 
specifically relating to GCC, there is no shortage of material written on matters of 
                                                 
13 This approach to measuring mitigative potential seeks to capture three measures of current emissions. 
Emissions per unit GDP is a measure of economic efficiency, emissions per capita would indicate 
unsustainable consumption patterns, and the rate of emissions growth would indicate if emissions have 
already been curbed or can be expected to increase in the near future. 
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distributional justice in general at both intra- and international levels. Thus, some of the 
reviews below are in response to the authors’ original work on the subject, whereas 
others are my interpretation of a more general theory as applied to the distribution of 
burdens in GCC.  
Beginning with the proposals which address GCC specifically, Martino Traxler 
(2002) has advocated for a division of burdens among equally burdensome shares. 
Traxler defines “equally burdensome” as having equal opportunity costs in terms of 
human welfare. The motivation for Traxler’s proposal is to counter the sentiments of 
some developed nations, whereby they would only reduce their emissions if developing 
nations committed to reductions as well.14 Traxler emphasizes the distinction made by 
Henry Shue (1993) between “luxury” and “subsistence” emissions. It is a fact of our 
current infrastructure that a certain amount of carbon must be emitted for the basic 
processes of survival (growing crops, purifying water, distributing goods, etc…) This 
distinction motivates Traxler to favor a measure of human welfare opportunity cost rather 
than traditional financial opportunity cost. Whereas a calculation of equally burdensome 
shares according to standard financial opportunity would be relatively easy (emphasis on 
“relatively”) it could lead to nations being required to reduce subsistence emissions while 
other nations were permitted to continue their luxury emissions. A problem which 
Traxler acknowledges is that the calculations of human welfare opportunity cost are 
much more difficult to determine than are traditional financial opportunity costs.  
                                                 
14 United States President George W. Bush is quoted as saying, “I’ll tell you one thing I’m not going to do 
is I’m not going to let the United States carry the burden for cleaning up the world’s air, like the Kyoto 
treaty would have done. China and India were exempted from that treaty. I think we need to be more even-
handed.” (Singer 2002) 
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A second distinction on which Traxler focuses is between forward-looking and 
backward-looking approaches. The approach which he ultimately proposes purposefully 
avoids any measure of historical responsibility which would be included in a backward-
looking approach. He commits himself to a purely forward-looking approach out of a 
practical worry that responsible nations would not agree to, or would defect from a 
scheme which included a backward-looking component. Traxler uses a somewhat 
unconventional terminology, denoting backward-looking approaches as ones that address 
“justice” and forward-looking approaches as ones that address “fairness.” Traxler 
recognizes the ethical limitation of his approach, remarking, “…a fully moral treatment 
of this question would take account of both fairness and justice….” Further preventing 
his inclusion of measures of “justice” (backward-looking measures) is the view that any 
such arrangement would first require “an international agreement on what constitutes 
international distributive justice.” Rather than waiting for that to happen, Traxler 
proposes that we act on GCC using an approach which is entirely forward-looking. 
 Peter Singer (2002) advocates an approach that would distribute the global carbon 
carrying capacity of the atmosphere on an equal per capita basis. This approach, like 
Traxler’s (2002), is entirely forward-looking, taking no consideration of a nation’s 
historical responsibility for GCC. The reasoning for Singer’s proposal is quite simple, 
positing that unless there is a good reason for moving from it, the equal distribution of 
this resource is the most appropriate. One possible concern with such an arrangement is 
that it would provide an incentive for population growth. Singer counters this by 
proposing that a particular year be chosen for all countries rather than scaling emission 
allotments up with population. This approach, when applied most simply, would punish 
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nations with a particularly young population at present. Thus, Singer proposes that an 
estimate of future population be used. 
It is important to remark on the difference between Singer’s (2002) and Traxler’s 
(2002) approach. Whereas Traxler (2002) is looking at the burden of responding to GCC, 
Singer is looking at the remaining ability to emit carbon. These two approaches can be 
seen as two sides of the same coin. In any proposal to mitigate GCC, there is the question 
of how much carbon (and other GHGs) can be emitted before something undesirable 
happens. This defines how much carbon can be emitted, which is what Singer is 
concerned with. Taking it a step further as Traxler does, we can consider the burdens 
which such a limitation will entail. If a reduction in emissions were equally burdensome 
for each person, there would be no distinction between the two. Since there is a 
difference in the burdensomeness of reductions, the difference between the two becomes 
relevant. 
Continuing to look forward in questioning which nations are best able to bear the 
burdens of GCC mitigation, a measure of capabilities, as put forth by Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum, can be particularly enlightening in making that determination. Sen 
and Nussbaum advocate a capabilities-based approach to the common question of human 
rights. Rather than asking “Does Person X in Country Y have the right to activity Z?”, 
Sen and Nussbaum would ask about that person’s capability to do that activity. While it 
may be the case that children have the right to go to school in a particular country, they 
may not have the capability to. For example, their families may be too impoverished to 
afford to send the children to school. Even if the education itself is free, there is an 
opportunity cost to educating children, as it removes them from the pool of available 
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labor which may be needed for the survival of the family. The discussion of capabilities 
is connected to the issue of GCC insofar as GCC stands to threaten capabilities and/or 
capabilities are used as a measure of a nation’s obligation to address GCC.  
Sen and Nussbaum advocate the understanding of capabilities to take a broader 
perspective about what development means than a simple economic analysis would 
allow. The traditional method for determining the state of development in a nation, GDP 
per capita, does not take into account the full set of capabilities which are required to lead 
a full, human life. Furthermore, it is ignorant of the disparity of capabilities that may be 
present in a particular nation. In practice, Amarty Sen has been instrumental in the 
creation of the Human Development Index (HDI). This index, created by the United 
Nations Development Program, judges the level of development based not only on per 
capita GDP (though that is a factor), but education and life expectancy as well. A more 
full discussion of the HDI occurs below. 
 Any discussion of justice, particularly where the focus is on the disparity of 
justice, cannot avoid John Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Rawls’ theory is premised on two 
principles of justice and a hypothetical state in which individuals use the two principles to 
determine the structure of their society.15 The two principles are: 
Equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second 
holds, that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of 
wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits 
                                                 
15 Of course, the contribution to philosophical discourse contained in Theory of Justice is not limited to 
these two aspects. For example, the discussion of reflective equilibrium contained therein has contributed 
significantly to debates of meta-ethics. This paper, being concerned with applied ethics, does not discuss 
these other contributions. 
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for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of 
society. (1971, p. 13) 
In plainer language, the above principles guarantee equality of opportunity to political 
and professional positions and the equal ability to influence political processes. Secondly, 
Rawls holds that inequalities are only acceptable insofar as they improve the lot of the 
least-well off. Thus, Rawls disagrees with purely egalitarian distributions as well as 
utilitarian distributions which could seek to improve the lot of the better off at the 
expense of the less advantaged.  
Rawls proposes a situation, “the original position,” under which just decisions 
about the structure of society would be made. In this position no person would know 
his/her place in society so as to ensure that, “no one is advantaged or disadvantaged…by 
the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social situation” (1971, p. 11).  
Rawls’ theory applies to GCC in two important ways. First is the treatment of the 
least well off. If GCC itself threatens to increase the disparity in well-being between the 
most and the least well-off, then it is a matter of particular concern. The second is a 
procedural consideration. In determining the most just way to deal with GCC, Rawls 
would claim that exploring the issue from the original position will lead to a just solution. 
It is important to recognize, however, the considerable limitation which Rawls puts on his 
theory. Rawls holds that his theory can only apply at the domestic level, for people in one 
nation who have agreed to be subject to their own authority. This limitation is motivated 
by considerations of state sovereignty and legitimacy, and skepticism about the 
possibility of internationally legitimate authority. Rawls discusses this aspect of his 
theory more completely in his Law of Peoples.  
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Not all authors take Rawls’ (1971) theory to completely preclude aspects of 
international justice as Rawls himself does.16 In particular Thomas Pogge (1994) argues 
for an international, egalitarian distributive mechanism derived from Rawls’ own 
arguments. Pogge proposes that a global resource tax (GRT) be paid by all national 
governments for the natural resources which they choose to extract. The obvious 
candidate for this tax is non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels and minerals, but 
Pogge holds that it can be extended to reusable resources and, “especially, to air and 
water used for the discharge of pollutants.”  The nation extracting the resource or 
emitting the pollutants would be responsible for paying the tax regardless if the resource 
were being used domestically or if it were being shipped abroad. Nations would raise the 
funds for the tax however they so chose and would then pay them to a facilitating 
organization (e.g. the World Bank or United Nations) who would then distribute the 
revenues so as to “emancipat[e] the present and future world poor.” Ultimately, “the GRT 
payments would enable the governments of the poorer peoples to maintain lower tax 
rates, higher exemptions and/or higher domestic spending for education, health care, 
microloans, infrastructure, etc. than would otherwise be possible.” 
Though Pogge’s proposition is significant for its interpretation of Rawls’ theory, 
it is also interesting simply for its understanding of international resource distribution. 
Naturally, his concepts are relevant to GCC in terms of distributing the burdens of 
mitigation and the remaining resources of the atmosphere. For example, under a global 
cap-and-trade system of the remaining carbon-carrying capacity of the atmosphere there 
is the significant question of how to initially distribute that resource. Doing so would 
                                                 
16 While Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) is specifically limited to issues of domestic justice, his later work, 
Law of Peoples (2001) does address issues of international justice. This later work is discussed more fully 
below. 
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impose a limit on the ability of certain nations to emit greenhouse gases and would thus 
entail tangible burdens for those nations. This would act, in a sense, like a tax on 
consumption, though it is important to note that a cap-and-trade system imposes hard 
limits on consumption whereas Pogge’s GRT does not. On a final note, some of the 
mechanisms which Pogge proposes for the collection of his GRT could work to process 
the instruments required by a GCC solution. 
 
3.3 Evaluation of existent approaches 
 Having considered that limited selection of previously proposed approaches, it is 
now possible for me to evaluate their merits and demerits and to come to a conclusion on 
what are the appropriate considerations for addressing GCC. 
 Before beginning the full evaluation of the approaches, it is important to be 
reminded of what it is we are attempting to accomplish. In summarizing the approaches 
above, I have focused on how they distribute the burdens of addressing GCC. In the 
interest of brevity, I am using the term “obligation” to refer to the obligation to address 
GCC and, therein, to bear a share of the burdens thus required. In that sense, to say that 
Nation A has a greater obligation than Nation B is to say that Nation A ought to bear a 
larger share of the burdens than Nation B. Thus, I am looking for a measure of obligation 
to address GCC and asking what are the relevant factors which would contribute to such 
a measure. Secondly, I am looking for a way to translate that measure of obligation into 





As the summaries have shown, there is no consensus on the process by which a 
measure of obligation should be determined. Some take a very practical approach, 
limiting the options to what is perceived as possible given the current political climate, 
whereas others seek to derive the notions of distributive justice through first principles of 
morality. Unsurprisingly, I am taking the second approach. By taking this approach, I 
simply rule out some of the approaches. I rule out the Bottom-Up approach and the ad 
hoc distribution of commitments used in the Kyoto process and remove them from the 
possible choices. It is necessary, however, to first remark on why these approaches are 
unethical. 
 The basic notion of justice holds that decisions should not be made arbitrarily; 
that there will be some reason for having made that decision. In the words of Rawls, 
“institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the 
assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance 
between competing claims to the advantages of social life” (1971). As Rawls remarks, 
such a definition can be agreed upon by individuals with competing claims of justice as 
the definition of “arbitrary distinction” remains open.  
 One such example of arbitrariness which Pogge (1994), among others, advances 
is the historical arbitrariness of national borders and “the enormous distributional 
significance national borders now have.” There are two main points which Pogge (1994) 
makes in this claim, that national borders are historically arbitrary and that they carry 
distributional significance. Both of these points are supported by empirical fact.  
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Considering the historical arbitrariness of national borders we must only recall the 
history of most any nation. Its borders have been shaped by centuries, in some cases 
millennia, of conflict and coercion whereby the powerful have out-battled, out-
negotiated, or simply stolen from their weaker neighbors. Looking specifically at the 
example of the United States, the entirety of its land was occupied at the time when it was 
“settled” by the immigrant Europeans. Through a series of trades and battles with the 
indigenous people of the land, the United States has come to be the most powerful and 
one of the most resource-rich nations in the world. Its claim to the resources which it 
possesses is based on the means with which it acquired them. In many situations the 
course of history could have taken a vastly different turn, defining large swaths of land 
and resources to its neighbors. This, of course, is not meant to be an individual attack on 
the United States, for the same could be said of any other nation in the world.  
The fact that being member of one nation rather than another implies significantly 
different life prospects for an individual is so near a platitude that it barely warrants 
discussion, but examples of the sheer scope of the disparity are helpful to put the situation 
into perspective. Consider life expectancy, perhaps the most basic component to living a 
good life (as simply living is required for such). A person born in Swaziland, a 
landlocked African nation bordered on three sides by South Africa and on the fourth by 
Mozambique, is expected to live, on average to be 32.5 years old (UNDP 2005). 
Compare that to Switzerland, a landlocked European nation, where the average person 
can expect to live to be 80.5 years old, a difference of 48 years (UNDP 2005). In other 
words, a person from Switzerland can expect to live 2.5 times longer than a person from 
Swaziland. That is, while the average Swiss person is progressing from life to death, one 
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person from Swaziland, born at the same time as the Swiss, can grow and die, followed 
by another person who can grow and die and followed by another person who can grow 
and reach middle-age (at age 15 no less!) all before the Swiss person passes away. How 
can such a distinction, being Swazi or being Swiss, which leads to such an utterly 
dramatic difference in capabilities, possibly be justified? Other measures of capability 
show an even sharper distinction. Sierra Leone has a per capita GDP of $548 whereas 
Luxembourg enjoys a rate of $62,298 113 times as much (UNDP 2005). Whereas 99 out 
of 100 adults in most any European or North American country can read, only 1 in 7, or 
14%, of adult Nigerians can claim the same basic capability (UNDP 2005).17 I could 
continue to belabor this point with numerous statistics; but it should be abundantly clear 
that the reality of the world in which we currently reside shows Pogge’s (1994) assertion 
to be valid. 18
Bringing the discussion back to GCC, it is important to consider how the arbitrary 
facts of human and natural history contribute to the determination of the obligation to 
address GCC. In this case we don’t need to hypothesize, as the process of determining the 
commitments in the Kyoto Protocol provides just such an example.  
Due to a variety of occurrences which involved both chance and less noble 
conditions, the United States has come to be the sole superpower of the world.19 Having 
achieved that position, the United States is in a position to influence any international 
                                                 
17 All data for this section are taken from the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development 
Index, 2005. 
18 There are some, notably Nietzsche, who would claim that assertion of power is the purest expression of 
humanness. Most discussion of justice, both ancient and modern, strives for something more. Such 
nihilistic arguments do not warrant a great deal of commentary in the contemporary literature and, thus, do 
not get any significant attention here. 
19 Of course, the rise of the US to this position was not only the result of iniquities. Many instances of valor 
and courage dot the history of this nation. This paper’s focus on the US is motivated by its dominant 
position in the political landscape and the author’s familiarity with its history. 
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decision, including those regarding the global climate. Describing the negotiations which 
led to the Kyoto Protocol, Gardiner (2004) recounts the United States’ actions as such: 
From the early stages, and on the most important issues, the United States 
effectively molded the agreement to its will, persistently objecting when 
other nations tried to make it stronger. But then it abandoned the treaty, 
seemingly repudiating even those parts on which it had previously agreed 
(p. 594). 
At the time when Gardiner wrote his essay, it was still uncertain if it would even be 
possible for the Protocol to come into support without ratification by the United States. 
Since then, the ratification by Russia has brought the Protocol into effect, but without 
world’s largest emitter of carbon.20 Very clearly, nations which have the power to bend 
international agreements to their liking will take the opportunity to do so.21 This fact 
alone, without even blaming the powerful nations for their actions,22 is enough to call for 
systems that prevent such an abuse of power.  
 In thinking how to design such systems we need not go further than Rawls and his 
original position. As originally constructed in A Theory of Justice, Rawls only intends for 
the thought experiment to be used at the domestic level. In Law of Peoples, however, he 
                                                 
20 In 2002, the United States emitted 5,773 Mt of CO2, 23.32% of the world total. In comparison, the next 
largest single nation was China, which emitted 3,783 MtCO2, or 15.28% of the world total. The comparison 
is even starker viewed against population. In that year the United States emitted 20 tons of CO2 per person, 
while China emitted only 3 tons of CO2. Taking measure of cumulative emissions only makes the matter 
worse for the US. Looking from 1850 to 2000, the United States has emitted 301,365 Mt of CO2, 29.64% 
of the historical total, while the next closest single nation, Russia, has emitted 83,643 Mt CO2, or 8.23% of 
the world total. (WRI 2003) 
21 “We will not do anything that harms our economy, because first things first are the people who live in 
America.”—US President George W. Bush, 2001 “The American lifestyle is not up for negotiation.”—US 
President George H. W. Bush, 1992. See footnote 4 above for another relevant quote (all as quoted in 
Singer 2002). 
22 One can imagine a powerful nation’s defense of “you would do it if you could too,” which is difficult to 
prove either way but certainly is rather likely to be true.  
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imagines a second original position consisting of delegates from each nation.23 The main 
point, however, of the original position is to get away from the self-serving nature of 
most political discussions and to focus more on what is truly just and fair. Any 
arrangement which allows individual nations to exploit the power asymmetries to the 
benefit of their own, vested interests is almost inevitably going to lead to some form of 
institutionalized injustice. It is what happened in the Kyoto proceedings and it is what 
will happen in future situations which follow the same procedural model.  
 The Bottom-Up model and an ad hoc method of distributing commitments would 
not be a fair means to generate an equitable response to GCC, because these methods 
allow power asymmetries among countries to determine the allocation of burdens of 
mitigation. What is needed, then, is the rational design of commitments of which 
Bodansky spoke. All of the other models listed above include a mechanism for designing 
commitments or burden sharing along lines other than political power and, thus, still 
stand for consideration. The great loss in excluding political power from the debate is in 
practicality. Just as the powerful nations have the ability to manipulate the process, they 
also have the ability to manipulate which process is chosen in the first place. Again, 
though, practicality is not of present concern. This is a matter taken up by non-ideal or 
imperfect compliance theories of ethics.  
3.3.2 Considerations of Obligation 
Having excluded political power from the process of determining obligation, it is 
now relevant to ask what the relevant considerations for that measure of obligation are. In 
the approaches summarized above (to say nothing of those not included) there are a great 
                                                 
23 More accurately, Rawls would have a representative from each group of “peoples,” Rawls’ preferred 
socio-political grouping. Though distinguishing between states and peoples is, in fact, the main point of 
Law of Peoples, it is a distinction which is not particularly relevant to this discussion. 
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number of options for making this determination. Naturally, they fall into the two 
categories for considerations of justice which are typical in the discourse of ethics, those 
which are forward-looking and those which are backward-looking.24
 Responsibility 
Backward-looking approaches, or measures of responsibility, combine 
considerable moral force and marked intuitive simplicity. This makes them hard to ignore 
in the discussion of obligation. The most common approach to resolve typical 
environmental problems is the “Polluter-Pays Principle.” In terms of official 
documentation, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development states it 
quite clearly and very early in the discussion of environmental ethics. In a 
recommendation on the guiding principles concerning international economic aspects of 
environmental policies the group states, “the polluter should bear the expense of carrying 
out the ... measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an 
acceptable state (OECD 1972).” It is almost difficult to discuss the moral force of this 
principle because it is so obvious. Shue (1999) describes it as a “commonsense principle” 
of equity: gift shops the world over make claim to it with signs reading, “You break it, 
you buy it!” It is difficult to find a simpler, more readily understood and agreed-upon 
measure of obligation to resolve any question of who should bear the burden of 
correcting a problem. If you are responsible for the problem, then you are obligated to 
work to resolve it. 
                                                 
24 Singer (2002) uses terminology borrowed from Robert Nozick, calling backward-looking approaches 
“historical” principles and forward-looking approaches “time-slice” principles. As noted above, Traxler 
describes the former as issues of “justice” and the latter as issues of “fairness.” In the context of GCC, the 
South-North Dialogue (2004) uses the terms “responsibility” and “capability,” respectively. As these last 
two terms capture the issue of GCC most accurately, I will use them in the later portions of this paper. 
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Since the concept so plainly warrants inclusion in any measure of obligations, it is 
remarkable that so few proposed approaches include it in their assessments of obligation. 
The notable exceptions are the Brazilian Proposal and the South-North Dialogue. The 
differences between the two are what indicator is used as a measure of responsibility and 
that the South-North Dialogue creates a composite measure of obligation, including other 
measures as well. I will save the discussion on what the appropriate indicator of 
responsibility is for a section on technical choices below. 
It is not the case that others have simply ignored or somehow forgotten about the 
claims of responsibility. By and large the exclusion has been conscious and willful. In his 
comprehensive review of ethics and GCC, Gardiner divides the opposition to including 
measures of responsibility into two camps, objections on the grounds of mitigating 
ignorance about the harms of emissions, and objections on the grounds of pragmatic 
concern. Remarking on the suggestion that ignorance about the harms of emissions 
mitigates responsibility, Gardiner describes it as “far from convincing.” Referencing 
United States tort law, Gardiner notes that several environmental cases have allowed for 
“strict liability—i.e., instances where a party causing harm is liable for damages even 
when not guilty of negligence.” Thus, if responsibility is to be included in a measure of 
obligation, it should include historical data reaching as far back as relative scientific 
certainty will allow.25
                                                 
25 On a more practical note, using deeply historical data (e.g., dating back to 1850) does not change the 
ranking or relative positioning of the most responsible nations. In general nations which went through the 
industrial revolution the earliest, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, fair slightly worse 
under deeply historic measure. Methodological choices such as what indicator of responsibility used and 
whether or not to include emissions from land use change play a more significant role in determining the 
rank ordering and relative positioning of the most responsible nations (Den Elzen 2001, p. 63; Den Elzen 
2005, p. 278). 
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The more common objection to including responsibility in a measure of 
obligation is that it is impractical (Gardiner 2004, p. 581). Traxler (2002), as stated 
above, opposes the inclusion of a measure of responsibility on two grounds. First, such an 
inclusion would require an agreed-upon conception of global justice. Traxler concludes 
that that waiting for the generation of such an agreement would effectively put off “any 
implementation concerning climate change indefinitely.” Though certainly I agree that 
we cannot wait to act in response to climate change, I disagree with the assertion that any 
action on GCC using responsibility as a consideration would first require an agreed-upon 
conception of international justice. Gardiner calls to mind the Marshall Plan following 
the Second World War, which constituted a massive redistribution of wealth without 
having any background understanding of international justice. Moreover, it is imperative 
that the “ethical” approach to climate change mitigation not be simply reduced to what is 
considered practical. The approach should come from the other direction, asking what is 
ethical and then working to make it practical. 
Traxler’s (2002) second objection to including a measure of responsibility in 
determining obligation is that it will encourage the historical emitters to defect from any 
such regime. Gardiner (2004, p. 582) objects to this assumption on three main points, 
with which I largely I agree. The first is that any regime which does not include historical 
emissions will likely encourage the non-historical emitters to defect. The second is that 
an enforcement mechanism would not be impossible to implement. We could draw from 
examples operating today. The final objection is that the inclusion or exclusion of a 
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measure of responsibility is not the only factor in the regime which would influence 
defection and, in reality, is unlikely to affect defection one way or the other.26  
The main opposition to including a consideration of responsibility in the measure 
of obligation is derived from either a claim of ignorance or practical difficulty. Those two 
considerations are not enough to convince me that its inclusion would be inappropriate, 
especially given the intuitive plausibility of its inclusion. Thus, I conclude that a 
consideration of responsibility is not only appropriate to include but necessary to include 
in any meaningful account of ethical obligation to address climate change. 
Capability 
Having chosen “capability” to be my preferred term to describe forward-looking 
measures, it should be fairly clear in which direction I am going to turn. I show how 
capability is the relevant forward-looking consideration for a measure of obligation. This 
section will also address the moral force behind an equal per capita sharing of burdens 
and the particular moral force that such a distribution commands. 
It is important to first consider what a forward-looking consideration means in the 
context of GCC. It is a consideration which is blind to the antecedent causes of our 
present situation and which looks at both the current situation and the expected future 
situation to determine what would be a fair resolution to the issue. These considerations 
                                                 
26 The developed nations are most likely to defect as a result of including a measure of responsibility in 
determining obligation as it would, quite clearly, increase their level of obligation. There are two grounds 
on which to respond to this concern. The first is that any regime which is in the most basic agreement with 
the UNFCCC would require a higher burden be borne by the developed nations as Article 3, Section 1 
clearly states, “…the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof.” The second is based on the admittedly contingent facts of the situation which show 
that the responsible nations are also the most capable. Thus, including any information needed for a rational 
decision imposes greater obligation upon the developed countries. Developed nations are motivated to 
defect from any regime which is rationally-based or in compliance with the UNFCCC, regardless of 
whether it includes a measure of responsibility or not. 
-33- 
offer the possibility of “decoupling” the discussion from carbon.27 This approach has a 
particular attraction. By removing carbon from the determination of obligation, it 
presents the opportunity to treat GCC as any other humanitarian crisis to which the entire 
world must attend. The response to GCC could serve as a model for other responses by 
taking a forward-looking measure which is not limited to the situation at hand, but is 
general enough to capture the obligation to assist which is implicit in a higher level of 
capability. 
Before diving into an analysis of the above-summarized approaches, we should 
start by detangling that closing sentence of the preceding paragraph. What does it mean 
to say that there is an “obligation to assist which is implicit in a higher level of 
capability”? There are two concepts, the first being an obligation based on a particular 
state of being, the second is a concept of capability. Starting with the second, what is this 
notion of capability? According to Nussbaum (2002) capabilities are, “an account of the 
space within which we make comparisons between individuals and across nations as to 
how well they are doing.” (p. 123) To elucidate her description, Nussbaum draws 
comparisons against other measures of international development. The most “common” 
and “crude” method is to take a measure of GNP per capita. The shortcomings of this 
approach are twofold; first, such a measure does not take into account who has the money 
and can hide enormous inequalities and, second, it does not “provide any information at 
all about elements of human life that might be thought very important in defining its 
quality but that are not always well correlated with GNP per capita: educational 
                                                 
27 Carbon here is serving as a surrogate measure for other greenhouse gases. 
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opportunities, health care, life expectancy…”28 A “somewhat less crude” approach 
measures quality of life in terms of utility (subjective welfare) per capita. Nussbaum 
objects on three fronts; an aggregate measure of utility does no better than GNP per 
capita at exposing inequality, it treats the “irreducibly plural goods that figure in a human 
life” as commensurable, and the phenomenon of “adaptive preference”29 shows that 
reported satisfactions are not a very good measure of quality of life. The final approach 
which Nussbaum analyzes is the approach of Rawls, which “looks at a group of basic 
resources, and then asks about their distribution, asking, in particular, how well even the 
worst-off citizens are doing with respect to the items on the list.” Nussbaum references 
Sen’s criticism of this approach, that “individuals vary greatly in their need for resources 
and in their ability to convert resources into valuable functionings.” 
On the basis of these criticisms of alternative approaches, Nussbaum and Sen 
argue for a measure of capabilities. The question for Sen and Nussbaum is not, “How 
satisfied is person A?” or “How much in the way of resources does person A command?” 
but “What is A actually able to do and to be?” This approach does not limit the 
measurement of a society as an aggregate whole, but emphasizes the capabilities of each 
and every individual. Sen and Nussbaum diverge on what the central capabilities are. 
Nussbaum develops a list of twelve broad categories encompassing everything from life 
and bodily health to practical reason, friendship and the opportunity to participate in the 
political process. Sen’s view on relevant capabilities is evidenced in his work on the 
                                                 
28 For example, China has a GDP per capita of $5,003 and an average life expectancy of 71.6 years. Gabon, 
on the other hand, has a GDP per capita of $6,387 and an average life expectancy of 54.5 years. Compare 
Burkina Faso with a GDP per capita of $1,174 and an adult literacy rate of 12.8% and Tajikistan with a 
GDP per capita of $1,106 and an adult literacy rate of 99.5%. (UNDP 2005) 
29 Nussbaum recounts a case (itself borrowed from Sen) in which a survey of reported well-being was 
conducted in India after a famine and the responses showed widows as far less likely to report illness or 
indifferent health than the widowers. In Sen’s words, “Quiet acceptance of deprivation and bad fate affects 
the scale of dissatisfaction generated, and the utilitarian calculus gives sanctity to that distortion.” 
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United Nations Human Development Report and its Human Development Index. That 
gauge of well-being takes into account measures of life expectancy, education and 
wealth. The differences between the two sets of capabilities can be traced back to the 
authors’ personal predilections. Sen is an economist by training and, hence, has a 
preference for the quantifiable such as life expectancy, gross enrollment rate and GDP 
per capita. Nussbaum, on the other hand, is deeply Aristotelian in her philosophical 
foundations and thus seeks to capture the more abstract notion of a “good life” by 
including concern for political participation and friendship. What is common to the two, 
though, are the basic capabilities, those which prevent the enjoyment of other capabilities 
and therefore take a position of primacy. Basic measures of life, health, and control over 
one’s bodily integrity are central to both. Since GCC presents a threat to those most basic 
capabilities, there is no need to differentiate between to the two proponents of the 
capabilities approach. 
The second potentially controversial aspect of my statement above is that a nation 
with a higher level of capabilities has an implicit obligation to bear a greater share of the 
burdens associated with resolving a problem of global concern. The controversy 
surrounding this obligation is largely the result of a deceptive formulation of the 
principle. The suggestion is that having an obligation associated with the capabilities of a 
nation would constitute punishing nations (or individuals, for that matter) for their 
success. The implication is that we ought to be congratulating our most successful nations 
and individuals and not forcing them to bear the burdens of the least well off. The moral 
bearing for such a claim, however, is highly dubious. Given a situation which requires 
wide action, ought the burden be borne more heavily by those whose energies are largely 
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constrained to the provision of basic functionings,  or by those who have already 
achieved a level of basic function and now have the ability to enjoy a greater standard of 
being? Clearly an obligation for the more capable nations to bear a greater share of the 
burdens entailed in responding to a global problem is more demanding on them. Would it 
be preferable, however, for the greater burden to be borne by the less capable nations, 
who are already burdened by their domestic affairs? Certainly, any consideration of a fair 
distribution of the burdens would have to say no. This question raises the distinction 
between subsistence and luxury emissions, as discussed above. Any regime which 
restricts emissions required for subsistence prior to restricting all other luxury emissions 
defeats the humanitarian approach. The central purpose of that approach is to prevent 
shortfalls in the basic functioning of humans. If restrictions of emissions contributed to 
that shortfall, then clearly the approach is contributing to the problem and not to the 
solution.  
Turning now to the specific proposals summarized above, Traxler in particular 
claims to have a response to the above concern about placing a greater burden upon the 
more capable or the less capable. Traxler’s approach, of course, is to apply the burdens of 
GCC mitigation equally to all nations. To define an amount which is “equally 
burdensome,” Traxler looks to measures of opportunity cost, that is to say, the cost which 
will be incurred by bearing the burdens of GCC mitigation rather than doing something 
else. The central problem which Traxler faces is that traditional methods of determining 
financial opportunity cost remain ethically vacuous. That is because the opportunity cost, 
as measured in dollars, to limiting the production of luxury goods in one nation may be 
greater than limiting the production of certain staple items in other nations. To avoid this, 
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Traxler states that, “what is needed is a measure of opportunity cost that reflects the costs 
in terms of human well-being rather than in monetary costs.” Traxler acknowledges that 
no such measure of well-being opportunity cost currently exists and that creating one 
presents its own set of procedural challenges.  
The primary motivation behind Traxler’s choosing equally burdensome shares is 
the likelihood that it will garner the widest support in a global regime. This is a pragmatic 
concern. Gardiner shows that this approach may not be as practically attractive as it may 
at first seem. Though it divides burdens equally, Traxler makes it clear that developed 
nations ought to give up all of their luxury emissions before developing countries have to 
touch their subsistence emissions. Though certainly a morally relevant claim, it does 
undercut Traxler’s aims of creating an approach which would have significant practical 
appeal. That said, it is still worthwhile to consider the ethical implications of this 
approach.  
By and large I am in agreement with Traxler’s approach, though I believe that it 
can be reduced to the capabilities approach described above. In order to determine what 
the opportunity cost in terms of human well-being is for a nation to assume some burden, 
it will have to include myriad factors which could include both subjective and objective 
measures. Traxler observes a concern with the opportunity cost approach, that “the 
estimations that particular nations make of the benefits or losses associated with a 
particular project or cost may seem utterly exotic or unreasonable to other nations.” (p. 
132) That is to say, what is valuable in one nation may not be equally or at all valuable in 
another nation. At this point Traxler proposes that a measure of human well-being be 
used to avoid the particularities of a certain culture’s tastes. However, the conceptions of 
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what constitute well-being are at least as diverse as what constitutes good taste. In order 
to put into practice some international measure of well-being opportunity cost, there 
would have to be some approximation of consensus on what constitutes human well-
being. This, however, is exactly what Sen and Nussbaum are attempting to accomplish. 
Of particular note is Nussbaum’s (1990) “thick, vague conception of the good.” 
Nussbaum describes this conception of the good as, “an ethical-political account given at 
a very basic and general level, and one that can be expected to be broadly shared across 
cultures, providing focus for an intercultural ethical-political inquiry.” The measure 
which Traxler is seeking is the account of capabilities on which Nussbaum and Sen have 
been working for decades. 
 Understanding how the idea of capabilities, as advanced by Sen and Nussbaum, is 
connected with an obligation to address problems of global concern, it is now clear how 
the alternative proposals fall short of the ideal arrangement. The Ability to Pay model, 
with its focus on GDP per capita, is far too narrow in its scope of concern. Traxler’s 
model of equally burdensome shares reduces to a measure of capabilities. As stated 
above, however, this evaluation of proposals must still address a particularly weighty 
suggestion, the idea of equal per capita distribution of burdens. Naturally, the next section 
discusses this approach. 
 Equal per capita emissions rights 
 Notions of equality have been invoked in this paper multiple times, primarily in 
regard to an equal per capita distribution of emissions permits, as advocated by Singer 
(2002) and the equally burdensome shares of GCC mitigation as proposed by Traxler 
(2002). This distinction recalls the two sides of the same coin discussion in Section 3.2 as 
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the equal per capita distribution of emission permits has to do with distributing a resource 
whereas the equally burdensome shares of GCC mitigation has to do with distributing 
burdens. Distributing one does not equate to distributing the other as the current levels of 
emissions varies from nation to nation. For example, for the United States to have 1 ton 
of carbon to emit per person per year would require significant emissions reductions and, 
thereby, significant burdens. That same amount, 1 ton per person per year, is far more 
than Chad is presently emitting and would thus require no burdens to achieve. The equal 
per capita distribution of emission rights shares support both from the scientific and 
philosophical community with similar regimes proposed by both Anil Agarwal 
(Bodansky 2004) and Singer (2002). The primary appeal for the per capita distribution of 
burdens is its intuitive simplicity. At face value, a simple, equal distribution is the most 
straightforward form of impartial decision making. It reflects each person’s moral 
standing to make an equal claim on the world’s biggest public resource—its atmosphere. 
An equal per capita distribution of emissions rights captures the particular value of 
equality which theories of justice hold in such high regard.  
 An approach based on a conception of equality is, however, deceptive in its 
simplicity, so much so that Sen has devoted an entire book to the subject (Inequality 
Reexamined, 1992). The basic thrust of that work is to call attention to the large number 
of ways in which equality can be defined and the fact that, given the unavoidable 
diversity among humans’ situations,30 that achievement of equality in one dimension will 
result in inequality in other dimensions. There is always some way in which the 
arrangement is unequal, favoring some over another. Thus, the challenge is defining what 
                                                 
30 The simple diversity of physical shapes and sizes precludes the possibility of absolute equality. 
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ought to be the relevant considerations in defining equality, that is, asking, “Equality in 
terms of what?” 
 In the case of distributing the burdens of GCC mitigation, it makes sense to 
design the distribution from the most basic principles. Given the history of negotiations 
and the ability of powerful nations to bend the arrangement to their will, it is important to 
not deviate too far from the most fundamental and clear principles of justice, lest the 
deviations be distorted by the interests of the powerful. At the base of nearly all theories 
of justice31 lies a claim to equality in one form or another. Thus, in distributing the 
burdens of GCC mitigation, it is appropriate to initially assume an equal distribution of 
emissions rights based on nothing more than a person’s status as a person. It is not 
equality in terms of purchasing power, not equality in terms of the burden caused, but 
simple, per capita equality. Using this measure as the base, however does not and should 
not preclude its modification if warranted by other relevant measures. In order to 
approach the problem of distribution, however, from a truly impartial position, it is not 
immediately obvious how that would be done if we do not begin by assuming an equal 
distribution at the outset. 
 The question left lingering, then, is what would constitute a relevant measure for 
departing from the equal per capita distribution of burdens? The answer, quite clearly, is 
a measure of responsibility and a measure of capability. Imagine a house with seven 
undergraduates living together. Early one morning, they wake to find the sink has backed 
up and overflowed. Given no other information on the situation, the only fair distribution 
                                                 
31 Sen recounts a variety of theories and their invocation of equality: Rawls (equal liberty and equality in 
the distribution of ‘primary goods’), Dworkin (‘treatment of equals’ and ‘equality of resources’), Nagel 
(‘economic equality’), Scanlon (‘equality’), Nozick (equality of libertarian rights) and a “hidden equality” 
in utilitarian theories.   
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of the burdens of cleaning the mess is an equal share for each housemate. Perhaps, 
though, there is more information to be had. One house member has recently broken a leg 
while another is tending to urgent family concerns. It would be reasonable to say that 
those less capable housemates would be obligated to share a smaller portion of the burden 
or, perhaps, none at all. After the remaining five housemates have set to mopping up the 
mess and inspecting its cause, they notice a bright green sock blocking the drain. 
Knowing that only housemate wears such garish attire, there is clearly relevant 
information regarding responsibility for the mess. It would then be appropriate to say that 
the housemate who is responsible for the mess is obligated to bearing a larger share of its 
resolution.  The intuitive and ethical appeal of such an approach is abundantly clear. It is 
the approach which I am proposing for GCC. 
 
3.4 Proposal of a new approach
 Drawing inspiration from the South-North Dialogue (2004), I propose that the 
distribution of burdens entailed in a response to GCC be based on a modified per capita 
approach. The relevant considerations which ought to modify that per capita distribution 
are a measure of responsibility and a measure of capability. This approach would be both 
forward-looking and backward-looking and aims at capturing all of the information 
relevant to determining an equitable distribution in one approach. To review the situation 
and arguments thus far, GCC stands to threaten the lives and well-being of an immense 
number of people. There is an uncontroversial humanitarian duty to respond to situations 
of this kind as well as a negative duty to not harm others. Responding to this situation, as 
is the case in any other humanitarian response, will be burdensome for those that do 
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respond. The distribution of burdens ought to be on an equal per capita basis unless there 
is other relevant information to do otherwise. Measures of responsibility and capability 
present just such information and show that an equal per capita distribution of burdens is 
insufficient to capture all of the morally relevant information surrounding GCC.  
There are two main arguments doing the work here. The first is the rather 
uncontroversial argument that we must respond to GCC in one way or another. The 
second is a more complex, potentially controversial argument for the distribution of the 
burdens associated with the response required by the first argument. The first argument 
finds wide support in the literature of ethics. Even authors skeptical about the notion of 
international justice32 make a claim to the basic humanitarian duty to prevent catastrophe, 
and, even more urgently, to not cause catastrophe. It would be possible to do away with 
the second argument all together and simply leave the distribution of the burdens to some 
negotiation process. This approach has been attempted and has been shown to be 
susceptible to the manipulation of the powerful to the disadvantage of the less-powerful. 
Thus, there needs to be some rational design of the distribution. Stripping away all of the 
information which could lead to procedural bias, a simple equal per capita distribution of 
burdens is the only sensible approach. Upon further review, however, such an approach 
seems to have gone too far and has removed information relevant to determining the 
distribution of burdens. The polluter-pays principle, what Shue (1993) calls a 
“commonsense principle,” holds that those who are responsible for the problem ought to 
bear a great portion of the burden entailed in resolving it. A forward-looking approach 
asks whether it is appropriate to distribute the burden equally to all nations, regardless of 
                                                 
32 Nagel (2005) assumes that there is a “minimal concern we owe to fellow human beings” threatened with 
the consequences of a catastrophe. Rawls makes a similar claim in his Law of Peoples.  
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their ability to handle it without harming their own populations. Advocates of a strong 
sense of global justice, such as Pogge, see this as necessary and show that Rawls, on his 
own grounds, would have to concede. Sen and Nussbaum show that the appropriate 
measure of capability is not a simple measure of GDP per capita, but a more complex 
calculation of well-being encompassing many attributes of a well-lived life. Combining 
capability to respond and responsibility for the problem gives a measure of obligation. 
Calculating obligation per capita will allow for a relative comparison of one nation to 
another. That value can then be scaled to population to yield an absolute value of 
obligation which is necessary for calculating the final distribution of burdens. 
 
3.5 Technical Choices 
In order to perform the proposed calculations, it is necessary to choose some data 
for each of the relative measures. The basic equal per capita distribution requires nothing 
more than world population data, which is readily available from the World Bank. It is 
not as clear what data should be used for calculating the measures of responsibility and 
capability. This section will justify the choices that I have made. 
3.5.1 A Note on Indexing
Given the variety of data and units involved in these calculations, indexing is 
frequently used to put the measures on a common scale. The concept of indexing is quite 
simple. The purpose is to proportionally scale the data, whatever the range, from one to 
zero. To do that, one employs a simple formula for each data point: (actual value – 
minimum value) / (maximum value – minimum value). Under such a calculation, the 
minimum value in the index has a value of zero and the maximum value in the index has 
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a value of one. The relative distance between all other data points in the set is maintained; 
the only difference is that it is now scaled down. This would not be particularly 
informative if only one data set were being considered. With one data set, the only 
advantage is the intuitive understanding of where 0.12 lies on a scale of 0 to 1 as 
compared to where 3,266 lies on a scale of 406 to 24,243. The important advantage 
comes in comparing data sets of different units and, especially, in creating an aggregate 
index from multiple indices.  
3.5.2 Measure of Responsibility 
The following debates regarding indicators of responsibility have been played out 
on the political and academic stages in the context of the Brazilian Proposal to the Kyoto 
Protocol. As originally proposed in 1997 during the third Conference of Parties which 
established the Kyoto Protocol, the Brazilian Proposal sought to apportion the burden of 
mitigating emissions based on the integrated past concentrations of CO233, serving as a 
rather simple proxy for temperature increase (UNFCCC 2002, Rosa et al. 2003). The 
Proposal was not accepted in its initial form at COP-3, but garnered significant attention 
and was referred to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) of the UNFCCC. Since 1997 the Brazilian Proposal has been reviewed many 
times under the supervision of the SBSTA, This process has yielded some revisions 
which have been in keeping with the spirit of the original proposal. Rather than using 
integrated past concentrations as the indicator, the revised Brazilian Proposal uses more 
accurate, non-linear models to calculate temperature increases. In essence, the question 
                                                 
33 Integrated past concentrations of CO2 is an aggregate measure of historical emissions using basic 
calculus to find the total emissions over time. 
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which the Brazilian Proposal seeks to answer is what percentage of temperature increase, 
both historic and future, can be attributed to each country.  
To understand the variety of possible indicators or responsibility for GCC it is 
important to recall the physical process itself. The causal chain of GCC begins at the 
“greenhouse-effect,” the process by which atmospheric gases allow ultraviolet energy 
from the sun to pass unhindered, thereby warming the earth and being radiated back as 
infrared energy which is trapped inside the atmosphere, a process known as radiative 
forcing. Certain quantities of the greenhouse gases are taken up by sinks on the earth 
eventually striking a balance between emissions and absorption. It is the overloading of 
this process which leads to the “greenhouse-effect,” the continual warming of the 
atmosphere, land, and oceans which causes the most concern. There are a number of links 
on this causal chain which can be targeted as the appropriate indicator of responsibility 
for GCC. These indicators, listed in order of increasing causal complexity, include 
cumulative emissions, current concentrations of greenhouse gases, past concentrations 
integrated with climate response, radiative forcing, integrated past radiative forcing, 
integrated future radiative forcing, temperature increase, rate of temperature increase, and 
sea-level rise (Rosa et al. 2004). All of these indicators take the data for historical 
emissions for each nation and then do increasingly complex calculations to derive their 
final values. There is an implicit trade-off between certainty and the closeness of the 
indicator to the actual impacts of GCC (UNFCCC 2002, Rosa et al. 2004, Den Elzen 
2002, Den Elzen 2005). According to the experts set to study these indicators, the ideal 
indicator should be close to the impacts of climate change, understandable to scientists 
and the public, and certain. An area of contention in the expert discussions is the notion 
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of “backward discounting,” whereby gases emitted long ago are counted for less than 
gases emitted more recently, due to their re-absorption and atmospheric decay. It was not 
decided whether the concept is appropriate to include and, if so, at what rate (ibid.).  
Pausing briefly from the technical discussion and taking the question from a 
purely moral perspective, the climate experts got it largely right. In an ideal world there 
would be a clear and completely certain measure for harm created by each country and 
how it affected each other country. Unfortunately, the world in which we are operating 
has no such measure and we must use proxies for that measure instead. The indicators 
listed above are just such proxies and each has its own set of advantages and 
disadvantages, as well as questions regarding the appropriate method for its creation.  
There has been considerable effort in determining historical cumulative 
emissions, most notably by the United States Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory's Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) and the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency's 
Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR). Given the amount of 
effort which has been focused on determining historical emissions, this indicator is 
considered the most certain (Den Elzen 2002, UNFCCC 2002, Rosa et al 2004, Den 
Elzen 2005). Unfortunately, as the foundation for GCC impacts, it is the furthest away 
from the actual impacts. The global carbon cycle is an extremely complex system as it 
includes both anthropogenic and natural emissions as well as re-absorption (Den Elzen 
2002). Determining who emitted what volume of carbon when is one challenge, but 
determining what has happened to that carbon since then is an entirely different 
challenge. Many models have been constructed to estimate what has happened to the 
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carbon and, over time, there have been considerable advances in making ever more 
accurate models (Den Elzen 2002). Using these models, namely MAGICC (Wigley 1993) 
and meta-IMAGE (Den Elzen 1998), it is possible to get a fairly accurate estimation of 
what has happened to the historical emissions, resulting in present-day concentrations of 
carbon attributable to each nation (Den Elzen 2002, Den Elzen 2005).  
Ultimately though, it is not the excess carbon in the atmosphere which is and will 
continue to be causing harm to people, but the effects of that carbon on the climate 
system. The next link in the causal chain from emissions to impacts is radiative forcing. 
Naturally, accompanying this progression down the causal chain is increased complexity. 
One important feature of radiative forcing is that each “additional unit increase of 
concentration will gradually have a relatively smaller impact on radiative forcing” (Den 
Elzen 2002), known as the saturation effect. In order to accurately determine national 
contributions to radiative forcing, it is necessary to understand that the impact of early 
emitters is greater than those who emitted later as the saturation was less pronounced in 
the past (Den Elzen 2002)34. This fact requires a non-linear approach to properly attribute 
radiative forcing of each nation (Enting 1998). Again, though, it is not the process of 
radiative forcing which is of concern to human processes: it is the consequences of 
radiative forcing. 
The step from radiative forcing to temperature increase is a rather substantial one 
on two counts; first, it gets into some of the most complex estimates of the impact of 
                                                 
34 The consequences of one emission event at a particular point in time are unlikely to be intuitive. There 
are multiple forces working in sometimes opposite directions to which ultimately determine the 
consequences of that one event. For example, though the emission event from long ago will have a greater 
affect on today’s climate as a result of the above-mentioned saturation effect, the absorption of that 
emission over time may have counteracted that effect. Ultimately, the question of how to accurately 
balance these forces is one for the climatologists designing and building the models used to perform the 
estimations. For this paper I have used data derived from CAIT which uses an admittedly simple linear 
model. 
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climate change and, second, it is the most palpable impact for most nations. One fact 
which complicates the calculations of temperature increase is the large heat capacity of 
the oceans. By absorbing a lot of the energy that is being trapped in the atmosphere, the 
world's oceans work as a buffer, catching and storing the energy without having 
noticeable impacts above the surface of the water. This imparts a significant time lag into 
the calculations, so significant that roughly 50% of the final global warming and sea-level 
rise will manifest itself decades or centuries after emissions have stabilized (Den Elzen 
2002). Further complicating things is the open, though rapidly closing, question of 
climate sensitivity. Most basically, the question asks how many degrees increase can be 
expected for a given quantity of carbon in the atmosphere. For example, should the 
concentration of CO2 be stabilized at 550 ppmv, the potential temperature increase could 
vary from 1.9ºC to 6.5ºC with a best guess of 3ºC (Figure 2). Given the wide range of 
uncertainty which is present in the models, it is difficult to predict exactly what increase 
in temperature will result from a given concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. 
Ultimately, though, in order to determine responsibility for GCC, it is not entirely 
necessary to know the absolute amounts by which each nation has increased the mean 
surface-air temperature of the world. What are most valuable are the relative 
contributions of each nation, information which can be determined from radiative forcing 
data and a reasonable estimation of how the climate systems will respond to that process. 
Still, though, it is not an increase in mean surface-air temperature which will be 
the most disruptive for human beings, but the effects which that increase will have on the 
natural systems of the earth. Examples include the collapse of the thermohaline currents, 
massive crop failures and, the most frequently discussed, sea-level rise (Pew 2001, 
-49- 
UNFCCC 2002). On the causal chain from emissions to impacts, these are the final link 
on the impact side. These are the changes which will most severely affect human beings 
and which would lead to the substantial reduction in human capabilities discussed above. 
However, these are the indicators of responsibility which are most susceptible to 
variation and uncertainty. Take, for example, sea-level rise. There are three primary 
factors which contribute to sea-level rise; the expansion of ocean water as it is heated, the 
melting of ice and its flow into the oceans, and finally, the displacement of water and the 
resulting rise in sea-level should ice shelves or sheets become destabilized by warming 
and previous sea-level rise (IPCC 2001 technical). The complexity of the calculations and 
the degree to which they rely on assumptions makes them less favorable indicators 
(UNFCCC 2002).  
Two final choices in determining the appropriate measure of responsibility is in 
regard to the time frame chosen and the source of emissions. Singer (2002) and Ott et al. 
(2004) propose that emissions only from 1990 to present be considered. As stated above, 
I disagree with this approach and consider emissions from 1850 until 2000, the fullest 
range of data available to me. Choosing what the appropriate sources of emissions to 
consider are is more complicated. The main distinction is between emissions from the 
combustion of fuels and emissions as a result of land-use change. Land-use change 
covers a broad range of activities from deforestation and reforestation to filling in 
wetlands and burning rangeland. The largest potential source of a net contribution to 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere comes from deforestation. This process contributes 
to global warming in two ways; the first being the direct addition of gases to the 
atmosphere as the natural material rots and the second being the destruction of what was 
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once a sink for CO2. This sink-to-source shift is a large potential source of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere and should be considered in any evaluation of responsibility. 
Unfortunately, the data available on land-use change is nowhere near as certain as the 
data on fuel use emissions (Den Elzen 2004). Including that data would introduce an 
unacceptable level of uncertainty in my evaluation and, thus, I regrettably exclude it from 
my evaluation. There is a need for this data to be collected more completely and more 
accurately in the future. 
Taking, then, national contribution to increase in surface temperature as the 
appropriate measure of responsibility, how do the nations compare to one another? The 
table (Table 7) of the full data for a 173 nations can be seen at the end of this paper. 
Table 1 summarizes the five nations highest on the responsibility index and the five 
nations  
Table 1: Ten nations with the highest and lowest five values of the responsibility/capita index 
Highest Nations Responsibility/Capita Index Lowest Nations Responsibility/Capita Index
Luxembourg 100.000 Nepal 0.035 
United States 78.823 Ethiopia 0.024 
United Kingdom 72.986 Eritrea 0.023 
Belgium 66.540 Chad 0.003 
Czech Republic 66.084 Burundi 0.000 
  Source: WRI 2003 
lowest on the index. The above list is created using available data reaching back to 1850 
when possible and scaled to a nation’s population in 2000. Figure 3 illustrates the 
distribution of the index, showing that there a very few nations with very high values and 
a great many nations with relatively low values. As shown, the majority of nations, in 
fact, have a responsibility per capita index value that is less than 10.  
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Figure 3 






























This distribution does not come as too great of a surprise, as it simply illustrates that a 
few nations are predominantly responsible for the temperature increase that the world has 
already witnessed. It is important to remember, as well, that it is not simply a few 
extremely populous nations who are skewing the distribution such. The index is 
responsibility per capita, meaning that a few nations have had a disproportionately large 
impact over time, given their population. In aggregate, the disparity is even more extreme 
with only 6 of 174 nations having an index value greater than 10.35
3.5.3 Measure of Capability 
 Deciding on the appropriate measure of capability to use is made much easier by 
the predominance of one such measure. That measure is the Human Development Index 
                                                 
35 Those nations are the United States (100), Russia (29.44), Germany (24.97), China (24.37), the United 
Kingdom (20.77), and Japan (14.13). (WRI 2003) 
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(HDI) as created annually by the United Nations Development Program. The HDI is a 
composite measure of three dimensions which are deemed “essential” for enhancing 
human capability (Noorbakhsh 1998).  Sen was instrumental in the creation of the HDI 
and, thus, it reflects his views on what human capability means. The three dimensions 
included in the HDI are life expectancy, as a measure of a long and happy life, 
knowledge, as measured by adult literacy (with two-thirds weight) and gross enrollment 
ratio (one-third weight), and a decent standard of living as measured by GDP per capita 
in purchasing-power parity (PPP) in  USD.36 In general the HDI is very simple in its 
calculations, creating an index for each of the three dimensions and then performing a 
simple average to come to the composite index. One aspect of complexity in the HDI is 
its use of goalposts. Rather than using the given maximum and minimum values for a 
particular data set, as is case in a standard index, the HDI uses values that its creators 
believe more accurately capture the demands of a well-lived life. The goalposts for the 
2005 HDI are listed in Table 2. A final point of note on the HDI is that is uses a  
Table 2: UNDP goalposts for HDI dimensions 
Indicator Maximum Value Minimum Value 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 85 25 
Adult Literacy Rate (%) 100 0 
Gross Enrollment Ratio (%) 100 0 
GDP per capita (PPP US$) 40,000 100 
 Source: UNDP 2005 
logarithmic transformation on the GDP per capita measurement. The result of these 
adjustments is to reduce some of the extreme unevenness in the data and to provide a 
measure which is more smoothly distributed across the set of nations. The motivation to 
calculate the income measure as such is because that measure is functioning not only as a 
                                                 
36 PPP takes into account not only the exchange rate, but the cost of goods and services in each nation. For 
example, PPP equalizes the cost between the falafel sandwich that costs $4.79 in Ann Arbor, Michigan and 
the similar falafel sandwich that costs 1 Egyptian Pound ($0.18) in Alexandria, Egypt.  
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measure of income, but as a surrogate for all of the other dimensions of human 
development not captured by the measures of knowledge and of a long and happy life. In 
short, it is a proxy for a decent standard of living. Since a decent standard of living does 
not require unlimited income, higher values are discounted (UNDP 1999).  
 As with any prominent feature in the academic and professional landscape, the 
HDI does not escape without a certain amount of criticism. One central point of criticism 
is the simple averaging that the index uses to combine the three dimensions. The 
interpretation of addition is that it implies perfect substitution between the dimensions. 
Since the goal is to measure progress in all three categories, then allowing for such a 
substitution permits one parameter to increase while another measure decreases, leaving 
the final average the same. It is proposed that the three parameters be multiplied rather 
than averaged, as this would require good performance in all three categories to have a 
high final mark (Sagar and Najam 1998). Another observed advantage of this approach is 
that it is more sensitive to improvements in low-performance dimensions than high-
performing ones. That is to say, an increase from 0.1 to 0.2 results in a greater change in 
the index than does an increase from 0.8 to 0.9. It is not entirely clear, though, the 
advantage that such a method would impart upon the system. It would lead to a 
drastically more asymptotic distribution of final values than would the approach used by 
the UNDP. This would not necessarily reflect the situation in the world more accurately, 
and would likely lead to a conclusion of greater inequality than actually exists.  
 Another criticism of the HDI is that its results don’t always match “what we see 
around us” (Sagar and Najam 1998). Here, a comparison is made between Switzerland 
and Mexico who, in 1997, had values of 0.99 and 0.96, respectively. The “absurdity” of 
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this is founded on the difference in per capita GNP values, $37,390 and $4,180, 
respectively. There are three points which are relevant in response to this criticism. The 
first is that the UNDP changed its method of calculating the index of standard of living in 
1999, showing that the HDI is an ever changing measure, responding to criticism and, 
hopefully, ever improving. The second is that using GDP per capita is not intended to be 
a measure of income, but a catch-all for capabilities which are related to a person’s 
income. The resources which a person commands are not to be intrinsically valued, but 
are used instead as a proxy measure of other capabilities which are not as easily 
quantified. Sen himself admits to the conceptual difficulty of including an income index 
in the HDI which had been designed from the beginning to get away from just such a 
measure (Qizilbash 2002). The third and final response to such a criticism is that it is 
based on preconceptions of what the state of development is in a particular country, in 
this case Switzerland and Mexico. Regionalism, nationalism, and racism can cloud our 
perceptions without our knowledge and it is important to evaluate our expectations 
against the results. If the results were derived in an appropriate and well reasoned 
manner, then it stands to say that it is our expectations which ought to be adjusted, not the 
measure itself. Creating a measure that matches “what we see around us” is, more 
accurately, creating a measure which matches what we expect to see and that expectation 
may not be founded on defensible grounds. 
 Though there is some concern about the strength of the HDI, it stands as certainly 
the best available measure and as a very good measure regardless. It captures the multi-
dimensionality of human development and gives a clear indication of a nation’s 
capability. As with the index of responsibility, the values for 173 nations can be found in 
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Table 7 at the end of the document, Table 3 is a summary containing the top and bottom 
five. 
Table 3: Ten nations with the highest and lowest values of the human development index 
Highest Nations HDI Lowest Nations HDI 
Norway 0.963 Chad 0.341 
Iceland 0.956 Mali 0.333 
Australia 0.955 Burkina Faso 0.317 
Luxembourg 0.949 Sierra Leone 0.298 
Canada 0.949 Niger 0.281 
  Source: UNDP 2005 
The HDI does not scale from 0 to 1 for two reasons. The first reason is the use of 
goalposts discussed above. The second is true for all composite indices; unless there is a 
nation with 0 (or 1) in all of its dimensions then no nation will have 0 (or 1) in the final 
index as a simple result of averaging. 
  Just as the distribution was shown for the index of responsibility per capita, 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of HDI values. This figure makes clear how the use of 
-56- 
Figure 4 



















goalposts and a logarithmic transformation of the GDP per capita measure make for a 
generally more linear distribution of values.  
 
3.6 Creation of the Obligation Index
 With indices of responsibility and capability defined and selected, it is now 
possible to combine them into an aggregate index of obligation. The first question in this 
process is how to combine the two indices into one. There are several increasingly 
complex mathematical methods that could be used for this step, but the simplest approach 
produces the best results. Employing a simple average of the two is intuitively simple and 
avoids the effects of multiplication. If the two sub-indices were multiplied by another it 
would doubly obligate those nations who are both highly capable and highly responsible. 
Furthermore, a low value in one of the two indices would significantly reduce the overall 
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index of obligation. This would not be appropriate as the measure of obligation is 
intended to represent the data as accurately as possible. Without further justification, 
nothing other than a simple average is warranted.  
 A second consideration is whether to weight the sub-indices. First, as stated 
above, without reason to do otherwise, a simple average should be employed. Second, as 
might be intuitively apparent, there is a high correlation between the two measures. 
Traxler (2002) hints at this connection when he includes, somewhat confusingly, the 
ability to pay approach in his account of backward-looking approaches. Traxler observes 
that a nation’s ability to pay is largely the result of its past emissions. Stated more clearly, 
a nation’s current state of capability is frequently the result of its previous 
industrialization which, in turn, entails emission of greenhouse gases. This intuition is 
verified simply by plotting the indices of capability and responsibility on the same graph, 
as is done in Figure 5. It is necessary to perform a logarithmic conversion on the measure 
of responsibility because, as shown in Figure 3, the distribution of values is decidedly 
non-linear and showing multiplicative effects.37 In order to perform a meaningful linear 
analysis this transformation is necessary and justified given the steps that have been taken 
to make the distribution of values in the capability index (the HDI) more linear. The 
correlation coefficient derived from the  
                                                 
37 It is wholly conceivable that beginning on a path of emissions enables further emissions, leading to an 
upward cascade of emissions and, thus, responsibility.  
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Figure 5 
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linear analysis of the two data sets is a rather high 0.82. Thus, weighting one index more 
heavily than the other would have little practical effect on the outcome.  
 Creating the index produces the results evident in Table 7 at the end of this paper 
and the summary of the five highest and lowest nations in Table 4 below.  
  
Table 4: Ten nations with highest and lowest values of the obligation index 
Highest Nations Obligation Index Lowest Nations Obligation Index
Luxembourg 97.450 Chad 17.052 
United Kingdom 83.861 Mali 16.669 
United States 83.693 Burkina Faso 15.880 
Belgium 80.520 Sierra Leone 15.031 
Germany 78.345 Niger 14.104 
  Source: WRI 2003, UNDP 2005 
Recall that the above values are the per capita values and must be multiplied by 
population to get a measure of absolute obligation.  
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 4. Into Practice
 Having an index of obligation, in itself, does little to actually address GCC; it 
must be applied, in some way, to the problem itself. In order to determine how to do that, 
it is helpful to review what the obligation index is and is not. It is a relative scaling of 
obligation to bear the burdens of climate change. The nations with higher values of 
obligation ought to bear a proportionally larger share of the burdens than those nations 
with a smaller value. It is a scale from 1 to 0, its values could be manipulated in any 
number of ways to yield different results.38 There is no intrinsic limitation as to how it 
should or should not be applied. How it is used is a separate matter from its method of 
and reason for creation.  
 Given the goal of GCC mitigation with the distribution of burdens based, in some 
way, on the obligation index, to what should the index be applied? A more fundamental 
question is what is the most promising approach to resolving climate change? Given that 
any approach will entail global burdens, it is both ethically and economically advisable39 
to pursue the lowest cost option. In the case of GCC mitigation, that option has been 
shown to be a global cap-and-trade system. 
 
4.1 Cap-and-Trade Systems
 The concept of a cap-and-trade system is quite simple. Given a certain quantity of 
gases which can be emitted while avoiding some consequence (the capping), that 
available quantity is divided and distributed as emissions permits among the parties 
                                                 
38 Naturally, such manipulation would require justification to be warranted.  
39 As well as called for in UNFCCC Article 3.3, “policies and measures to deal with climate change should 
be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.” 
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involved in the system. Certain parties will receive more than they need and other parties 
will receive less. The parties can then trade their allotments amongst themselves (the 
trading). The advantage of such a system is quite clear as well. The key observation is 
that the marginal mitigation costs are not equal the world over. In one study, the costs of 
making the commitments demanded by the Kyoto would be $311.80 per ton of CO2 for 
Japan and $0 for the former Soviet Union (Zhang 2004).40 Trading allows for “where 
flexibility,” the flexibility to make the lowest cost reductions first, regardless of where 
they are located (Edmonds et al. 1997). Given that there is no difference to the 
atmosphere where an emission occurs, it makes sense to make the reductions wherever it 
is possible to do so at the least cost. Various studies have attempted to calculate exactly 
how much cheaper it is to mitigate using a cap-and-trade system. Edmonds et al. (1997) 
calculated that for the United States to mitigate so as to reach 10% less than its 1990 
emissions would cost $173 per ton of carbon without trading and $38 per ton with 
trading. Zhang (2001) calculates similar costs for the United States to be $160 per ton of 
CO2 and $9.60 per ton of CO2. Clearly, there is an advantage for using this scheme. 
 The main determinant in the actual price of mitigation under a trading scheme is 
how broad it is, especially if it includes developing countries (Edmonds 1997, Zhang 
2000, Zhang 2001). By broadening the scope of the trading scheme, more low cost 
reduction opportunities are introduced and the same goal of reducing emissions to a 
specific level is achieved for far less cost. In nations with particularly high marginal 
abatement costs, the bulk of the permits used may come from trades with countries with 
                                                 
40 The possibility for $0 mitigation costs is created by the existence of what is called “hot air,” emissions 
allotments which exceed what the party is predicted to emit. Thus, the nation with the hot air could simply 
trade it away and still making its commitment and remaining on a “business as usual” path. It is possible 
that this form of “mitigation” could be profitable for certain parties. 
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lower costs. In his study, Zhang (2004) calculated that Japan would import fully 81.2% of 
its emissions permits from other countries while the United States would import 53.6%.  
 The advantages of using a trading system are clear. There are a number of 
practical concerns surrounding the implementation of such a plan, particularly 
surrounding enforcement and how to gradually include more parties. But that is not my 
primary concern. A cap-and-trade system provides, on paper at least, the lowest cost 
option for climate mitigation. Thus, it is the mechanism to which I choose to apply the 
obligation index. 
4.1.1 Initial Allocation of Permits
 An open question among the proposed cap-and-trade systems is how to distribute 
the initial allocation of permits. In many cases the Kyoto commitments are used, or, some 
grandfathered figure, for example, 1990 emissions (Edmonds et al. 1997, Zhang 2000, 
Zhang 2004). The initial allocation of permits, however, is central to how the burdens are 
shared amongst the parties. It is important to remark here on the possibility for some 
confusion between resources and burdens. In a sense, the remaining carbon-carrying 
capacity of the atmosphere is a resource which can be divided and distributed. As many 
of the authors have noted, this has the potential for significant wealth transfers dependent 
upon how the permits are initially distributed (Edmonds et al. 1997, Stavins 
forthcoming). The inverse of this, however, is the burden which is entailed in having to 
reduce emissions to meet those commitments. Whereas a nation would have previously 
been free to emit as it so pleased, it must now reduce its emissions to comply with the 
new demands. In the case of a cap-and-trade system, how much the nation would be able 
to emit would simply be a function of how many permits it could acquire given its 
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demand, the supply of the market, and the price at which those two factors meet. The 
burden which a nation bears under a cap-and-trade system is the number of permits which 
it does not receive and must acquire elsewhere. Thus, a nation with an obligation to bear 
a larger share of the global burdens than another nation will be granted fewer permits 
than it needs during the initial allocation phase. The opportunity to use the obligation 
index from above is clear.  
 Recalling back to the discussion of how to determine obligation, it was decided 
that an equal per capita distribution of burdens is appropriate unless there are other 
relevant considerations that require the equal per capita distribution be modified. The 
measures of responsibility and capability, as combined into the obligation provide just 
such a reason to depart from the basic per capita distribution. Applying this reasoning to 
the initial allocation of emissions permits is quite simple and requires only a few steps of 
arithmetic.  
 The first step is to invert the obligation index so that the large values become 
small and the small values become large. Given that it is scaled from 0 to 1, it is simply a 
matter of subtracting each value from 1. This first step is necessary because we want the 
nations with what began as the large values to receive fewer permits than they would 
have under a simple per capita permit distribution. The results of this step are in the 
column titled “Ob Coeff” (an abbreviation of “Obligation Coefficient”) in Table 7 at the 
end of this paper. This inverted measure of obligation is still a measure per capita and 
must now be translated to an aggregate measure. This second step is a matter of 
multiplying the obligation coefficient by the nation’s population. This yields the “carbon 
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coefficient” (abbreviated  “C Coeff” in the table).41 The ratio of each nation’s carbon 
coefficient to the sum of all nations’ carbon coefficients is equal to the each nation’s ratio 
of emissions permits to the total number of permits available. Thus, each nation’s 
allocation of emissions permits is determined by taking its ratio of its carbon coefficient 
to the sum of all carbon coefficients and multiplying it by the total number of permits to 
be allocated. In the case of the table at the end of this paper, a total of 40 billion carbon 
permits have been allocated.42 Each nation’s allocation is in the column titled “C 
Permits” (“Carbon Permits”). The column “% C Perm” is each nation’s percentage of the 
world total, the column “% Pop” is each nation’s percentage of the world population and 
the column “Ratio” is the ratio of each nation’s percent of the total carbon permits to its 
percentage of the world population. This ratio is mathematically equivalent to the number 
of permits allocated per capita in a scheme where the total number of permits allocated is 
equal to the total world population. Thus, nations with a higher ratio are receiving that 
many more credits per capita than a nation with a lower ratio.  
 Table 5 and Table 6 summarize the nations with the five highest and five lowest  
Table 5: Nations with the five highest allocations of carbon permits of 40 billion total 
Nation Carbon Permits % of World Permits % of World Population Ratio
China 8,702,115,963 21.755 21.755 1.022 
India 8,190,110,962 20.475 17.426 1.175 
Indonesia 1,539,676,378 3.849 3.520 1.094 
Pakistan 1,196,778,647 2.992 2.408 1.243 
Brazil 1,158,340,645 2.896 2.900 0.999 
Source: WRI 2003, UNDP 2005 
 
                                                 
41 The terms which I have coined for these columns are of no consequence as their values are simply steps 
on the way to the final distribution of burdens. 
42 The choice of 40 billion permits is motivated by the Eickhout et al. study (2003, p. 30) analysis of 
different scenarios required to achieve a 2ºC increase in temperature. The scenario which allowed for the 
highest annual emissions (650-WIRE scenario) allowed for 9.3 billion tons of CO2 to be emitted in 2050. I 
rounded this value up to 10 billion per year and multiplied by 4 to simulate a 4-year commitment period, in 
the mold of the Kyoto process. 
-64- 
Table 6: Nations with the five lowest allocations of carbon permits of 40 billion total 
Nation Carbon Permits % of World Permits % of World Population Ratio
Seychelles 532,043.745 0.001% 0.001% 0.971 
Dominica 481,138.548 0.001% 0.001% 1.018 
Antigua and Barbuda 460,971.682 0.001% 0.001% 0.907 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 298,770.650 0.001% 0.001% 0.962 
Luxembourg 127,526.715 0.000% 0.007% 0.043 
Source: WRI 2003, UNDP 2005 
allocations of carbon permits in absolute terms, of a total 40 billion distributed.  
As can be expected, the nations with the highest obligation indices have the lowest ratios 
and vice versa. Thus, to see the nations with the highest and lowest ratios, simply 
reference Table 4.  
 
5. Discussion
 This proposal is very broad and takes a very wide perspective on what is relevant 
information in considering the distribution of burdens entailed in GCC mitigation. It 
involves arguments from many arenas and data from many sources. By taking so many 
routes to reach its conclusion, it exposes itself to many avenues of criticism. Every 
choice; what argument to favor, which data to use, which calculation to perform, opens 
the entire proposal to review and debate. There are a few central themes on which most 
of the discussion is focused. The most obvious is the perceived impracticality of such an 
arrangement. The ethical justification for the approach as well as the process of putting 
those principles into practice is also an aspect open to discussion. Finally, the data on 
which the calculations are based is seemingly always open to debate. I will attempt to 





 The data on which the scientific claims for GCC are based receives more abuse 
and criticism than most any other set of data. The political motivation to not act on GCC 
is huge and, rather than arguing with the morality of the situation, politicians prefer to go 
after the data itself. Though the majority of the criticism is unfounded and is generated 
merely out of political expedience, there is some legitimate concern about the level of 
certainty present in the data. Typically, though, it is not the type of uncertainty that the 
politician would prefer not to use. As more and more data is collected and the models are 
refined, the general trend is that the consequences of continued emissions are going to be 
worse than originally predicted. Furthermore, there is a special concern regarding 
threshold events and the difficulty in predicting nonlinearities in the systems (Schneider 
and Azar 2001). While these arguments may make the case for mitigation even stronger, 
it might show that distributing burdens, or other activities which involve significant 
economic costs for nations, based on such information is inappropriate. There is a 
difference between acting out of precaution given a level of uncertainty and making 
dramatic policy choices with a similar level of uncertainty. The data which I have used, 
however, is data which has been discussed an evaluated for a considerable amount of 
time. At this point, even the data for implementing the Brazilian Proposal has been 
thoroughly vetted and deemed to have a level of uncertainty low enough to justify 
implementation (Den Elzen 2002, 2005).  
 Regarding the data used specifically in this report, most emissions and population 
data came from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), created and made freely 
available by the World Resources Institute (WRI). CAIT combines data from a number of 
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sources in order to present the analyst the fullest picture possible of GCC. The primary 
databases on which CAIT draws for the bulk of its emissions data are Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), the International Energy Agency (IEA), and the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). Each of these databases has its advantages and 
disadvantages; some score high in terms of geographic coverage while others score well 
in terms of geographic coverage. No one database has complete coverage on all fronts. 
By combining these databases into one easily navigated tool, CAIT aims to have good 
coverage along all parameters, using the best data available for the question at hand. 
Thus, one set of data taken from CAIT may have data points from a number of different 
sources.  
 CAIT is not only a store of data, but, as its name indicates, capable of its own data 
analysis. For example, the data on contributions to temperature increase used in this 
proposal were derived in CAIT, using its own model. The model that CAIT uses is self-
described as having “a simple relationship between radiative forcing and temperature 
increase” and is calculated, “in the simplest linear form” (WRI 2005). Clearly more 
sophisticated models would be more accurate in translating historical emissions into 
temperature increase though I am not expert enough to weigh the severity of the 
deficiencies inherent in CAIT’s model.  
 A more general criticism of CAIT is that it presents the data with an “aura of 
precision” which may mask “considerable uncertainty in the data below” (Baumert et al. 
2004). Thus, the ease with which the data used in this proposal were generated may be at 
the cost of certainty in the data itself. This is a tradeoff which I have accepted given the 
resources at my disposal, though clearly with more time and energy available, more 
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certainty could be gained in the data, strengthening the argument for its use in the manner 
which I have proposed herein. 
 
5.2 Method
 A theme throughout this proposal has been preference for the most simple, 
intuitive approach unless there is sufficient justification to depart from that approach. 
This leads to the possibility that I have erred on the side of simplicity to the detriment of 
my primary purpose. The most likely place where I see this as having happened is in the 
application of the obligation index to the distribution of carbon permits. There are a 
number of alternative methods which I can imagine that may prove to be more 
appropriate then my simple arithmetical distribution. For example, the obligation index 
could be scaled up or down to increase the total spread between the most and least 
obligated. Using the ratio of a nation’s percentage of world population and percentage of 
carbon permits as an example, at present the total range is from 0.043 (Luxembourg) to 
1.457 (Niger), a 33-fold difference. Removing the value of Luxembourg, as it is a 
considerable outlier, the total range is from 1.457 (Niger) to 0.274 (United Kingdom), a 
5-fold difference. There could be arguments for either more or less extreme distribution. 
Not having any good indication of relevant factors, I present the data as unadulterated as 
possible.  
 Another relevant question regarding the method used to generate the data in the 
final proposal regards the correlation between the measures of responsibility and 
obligation. If those two measures are so tightly correlated, it is useful to wonder if there is 
any need to have both measures. The answer to this question depends on how the 
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measure of obligation is intended to be used. If it is supposed to be a static measure, 
created with the present-day data and set for eternity, then the answer is no, there is no 
practical need to include both. If, however, the index of obligation is intended to be 
reassessed over time, then it is important to have both measures included. As time 
progresses and different measures are taken to address climate change, it is not certain 
that responsibility and capability will forever be so tightly correlated. Indeed, there is a 
sincere hope that they divorce from one another as nations gradually become more and 
more developed without emitting so many greenhouse gases. Decoupling development 
from emissions is a key challenge for the present and future. 
 Another question regarding the correlation between the two measures is what 
would the response be to a situation in which they were not tightly correlated, would 
there be justification for weighting one measure more heavily than the other? The 
challenge in responding to this question is balancing the needs of impartiality with the 
subjective nature of weighted averages. There is no clear indicator of whether 
responsibility or capability ought to be preferred, other than to consider the consequences 
of various approaches. Through a review of independent parties, it would be possible to 
assess different outcomes and to determine, according to some notion of justice, which 
approach is most suitable.  
 
5.3 Practicality
 Throughout the development of this proposal I have made it clear that my 
approach will come purely from the side of reason and data and that the results which 
follow will be just, despite how unpleasant or impractical they seem. I feel that I have 
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successfully followed that mission and that the results do have moral force, given my 
methods. At some point though I have to step down from the clouds and look at just what 
exactly I have created. The distribution which I have proposed concentrates a full 42% of 
the initial allocation of carbon permits in the hands of two nations, China and India. 
Nearly 75% of the permits are possessed by 20 nations, not one of which is a member 
state of the European Union. The United States, the sole super-power who can make or 
break international agreements, who in 2002 emitted 23.32% of the world’s carbon (WRI 
2003), will receive only 1.33% of the initially allocated permits. I might be so humble as 
to suggest that my approach may be politically impractical at present.  
 One way to mitigate the political impracticality of this approach is to not propose 
it as a method which ought to be adopted immediately, but as a final goal toward which 
we ought to strive. Imagine a cap-and-trade system started today. It would be possible to 
structure it around four-year commitment periods during which a certain number of 
permits are allocated.43 The number of permits allocated would correspond with the 
temporal position on a stabilization pathway. Given the calculations done, they could 
increase to a period around 2030 after which they would have to decrease and stabilize. 
The initial allocation period could start with a simple grandfathered allocation where each 
nation is allocated the scalar equivalent number of permits to what it would have emitted 
under a business as usual approach. At each allocation period there could be a gradual 
step toward my proposal and away from the grandfathered approach. At some point, say 
after 40 years or 10 commitment periods, my proposal would be fully implemented. The 
                                                 
43 Rather than allocating permits to all nations once every 4 years, it could be beneficial to employ a 
staggered allocation scheme whereby ¼ of the permits would be allocated every year so as to reduce the 
overall shock to the market when a vast quantity of permits are released. 
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nations feeling the strongest shock from my proposal would have had nearly two 
generations to adapt to the changes and challenges which it would entail.   
 The above suggestion should not be taken to mean that I am advocating for it on 
any ethical grounds, only in observation of the practical reality in which my proposal 
would have to work. I stand by its ethical force; it has been derived from reasoned 
principles of justice and the empirical data of the situation. The result is clearly shocking, 
but that is not to say that it is invalid. What is ethical and what is politically feasible are 
often not aligned. Continually conceding and allowing what is ethical to be reduced to 
what is deemed practical will only serve to further entrench the powers who presently 
determine what is practical. I am sympathetic to the desire to get something rather than 
nothing done, but catering to the least common denominator will continually reduce the 
bargaining position of those who attempt to make appeals founded in ethics. If it should 
become the norm that the person professing a solution to a political problem based on 
ethical standards is viewed as the radical, then I must admit that I hold little hope for our 
future. At some point ethics has to shout as loud as those who cry for pragmatism. Being 




 I have presented an approach to climate change mitigation which has approached 
the subject from a purely ethical foundation. The duty to respond to GCC, in one way or 
another, is uncontroversial. The choice of how to respond and share the burdens or 
responding is the main ethical choice in the discussion. My proposal uses measures of 
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responsibility, defined as each nation’s proportional contribution to surface temperature 
increase, and capability, as defined by the Human Development Index, to determine a 
measure of obligation, which is then used to modify an equal per capita distribution of the 
burdens entailed therein. The proposal is brought into practice by distributing the initial 
allocation of carbon permits in a global cap-and-trade system using the modified equal 
per capita approach. This proposal is intended to avoid the manipulation that powerful 
nations can wield over the less-powerful in negotiations and to not concede forceful 
ethical claims on the grounds of practicality. 
 The duty of responding to climate change, like most other ethical duties, is neither 
easy nor clear cut. With this understanding of an ethical response to climate change 
mitigation, hopefully some greater clarity can be achieved in other proposed responses 
that make greater or total concessions to pragmatic concerns.  
 We must not forget that the world’s social, economic, and political institutions are 
our creations and that we bear ultimate control over them. We must not resolve ourselves 
to what simply is, we must ask what ought to be. This is the basic demand of ethics, 
present in nearly every human choice, including the response to global climate change. 
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 Table 7: Full data set used to distribute burdens of climate change mitigation 
Country Obligation HDI 
Temp 
Index Ob Coeff Population C Coeff C Permits % C Perm % Pop Ratio 
Albania 0.413 0.78 0.047 0.587 3,150,265 1,848,362 20,842,719 0.052% 0.052% 0.995 
Algeria 0.378 0.722 0.034 0.622 31,320,430 19,478,597 219,646,883 0.549% 0.520% 1.055 
Angola 0.226 0.445 0.006 0.774 13,121,250 10,161,059 114,579,345 0.286% 0.218% 1.314 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.466 0.797 0.134 0.534 76,485 40,880 460,972 0.001% 0.001% 0.907 
Argentina 0.478 0.863 0.092 0.522 37,515,630 19,598,159 220,995,103 0.552% 0.623% 0.886 
Armenia 0.408 0.759 0.058 0.592 3,067,953 1,814,817 20,464,453 0.051% 0.051% 1.004 
Australia 0.669 0.955 0.383 0.331 19,662,800 6,508,219 73,388,754 0.183% 0.327% 0.562 
Austria 0.641 0.936 0.345 0.359 8,066,000 2,899,422 32,694,805 0.082% 0.134% 0.610 
Azerbaijan 0.445 0.729 0.161 0.555 8,172,000 4,534,879 51,136,746 0.128% 0.136% 0.941 
Bahamas 0.571 0.832 0.310 0.429 313,989 134,641 1,518,260 0.004% 0.005% 0.727 
Bahrain 0.588 0.846 0.330 0.412 697,846 287,600 3,243,067 0.008% 0.012% 0.699 
Bangladesh 0.261 0.52 0.002 0.739 135,683,700 100,296,563 1,130,976,078 2.827% 2.255% 1.254 
Barbados 0.477 0.878 0.076 0.523 269,384 140,896 1,588,792 0.004% 0.004% 0.887 
Belarus 0.530 0.786 0.274 0.470 9,925,000 4,663,020 52,581,702 0.131% 0.165% 0.797 
Belgium 0.805 0.945 0.665 0.195 10,333,000 2,012,868 22,697,737 0.057% 0.172% 0.330 
Belize 0.388 0.753 0.024 0.612 265,200 162,189 1,828,894 0.005% 0.004% 1.038 
Benin 0.216 0.431 0.002 0.784 6,552,181 5,135,209 57,906,258 0.145% 0.109% 1.330 
Bhutan 0.269 0.536 0.002 0.731 851,009 622,083 7,014,808 0.018% 0.014% 1.240 
Bolivia 0.351 0.687 0.016 0.649 8,645,222 5,608,049 63,238,154 0.158% 0.144% 1.100 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.456 0.786 0.126 0.544 3,828,000 2,083,309 23,492,058 0.059% 0.064% 0.923 
Botswana 0.292 0.565 0.019 0.708 1,711,770 1,211,665 13,663,127 0.034% 0.028% 1.201 
Brazil 0.411 0.792 0.031 0.589 174,485,400 102,723,292 1,158,340,646 2.896% 2.900% 0.999 
Brunei Darussalam 0.586 0.866 0.306 0.414 350,627 145,146 1,636,711 0.004% 0.006% 0.702 
Bulgaria 0.544 0.808 0.279 0.456 7,869,000 3,590,321 40,485,610 0.101% 0.131% 0.774 
Burkina Faso 0.159 0.317 0.001 0.841 11,831,090 9,952,363 112,226,023 0.281% 0.197% 1.427 
-77- 
Burundi 0.189 0.378 0.000 0.811 7,070,999 5,734,580 64,664,958 0.162% 0.118% 1.376 
Cambodia 0.286 0.571 0.000 0.714 13,172,240 9,408,627 106,094,685 0.265% 0.219% 1.212 
Cameroon 0.250 0.497 0.003 0.750 15,769,270 11,827,890 133,375,066 0.333% 0.262% 1.272 
Canada 0.720 0.949 0.490 0.280 31,362,000 8,791,310 99,133,623 0.248% 0.521% 0.476 
Cape Verde 0.363 0.721 0.005 0.637 458,030 291,784 3,290,248 0.008% 0.008% 1.081 
Central African Republic 0.178 0.355 0.001 0.822 3,820,085 3,140,341 35,411,487 0.089% 0.063% 1.395 
Chad 0.171 0.341 0.000 0.829 8,340,787 6,918,548 78,015,762 0.195% 0.139% 1.407 
Chile 0.458 0.854 0.061 0.542 15,589,000 8,456,184 95,354,627 0.238% 0.259% 0.920 
China 0.397 0.755 0.040 0.603 1,280,400,000 771,715,991 8,702,115,964 21.755% 21.277% 1.022 
Colombia 0.408 0.785 0.030 0.592 43,834,000 25,969,992 292,845,927 0.732% 0.728% 1.005 
Comoros 0.274 0.547 0.001 0.726 585,937 425,249 4,795,248 0.012% 0.010% 1.231 
Congo 0.259 0.512 0.005 0.741 3,656,658 2,711,026 30,570,398 0.076% 0.061% 1.258 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 0.193 0.385 0.002 0.807 51,579,780 41,605,187 469,153,379 1.173% 0.857% 1.368 
Costa Rica 0.428 0.838 0.018 0.572 3,941,750 2,254,952 25,427,557 0.064% 0.066% 0.970 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.213 0.42 0.005 0.787 16,513,120 13,002,846 146,624,238 0.367% 0.274% 1.336 
Croatia 0.483 0.841 0.125 0.517 4,440,000 2,295,787 25,888,023 0.065% 0.074% 0.877 
Cuba 0.446 0.817 0.076 0.554 11,251,000 6,228,483 70,234,368 0.176% 0.187% 0.939 
Cyprus 0.509 0.891 0.128 0.491 764,967 375,363 4,232,710 0.011% 0.013% 0.832 
Czech Republic 0.767 0.874 0.661 0.233 10,201,000 2,372,528 26,753,385 0.067% 0.170% 0.395 
Denmark 0.684 0.941 0.427 0.316 5,374,300 1,697,262 19,138,864 0.048% 0.089% 0.536 
Djibouti 0.252 0.495 0.010 0.748 693,480 518,389 5,845,525 0.015% 0.012% 1.268 
Dominica 0.400 0.783 0.016 0.600 71,079 42,668 481,139 0.001% 0.001% 1.018 
Dominican Republic 0.387 0.749 0.025 0.613 8,612,860 5,281,244 59,552,997 0.149% 0.143% 1.040 
Ecuador 0.391 0.759 0.023 0.609 12,807,460 7,797,663 87,928,937 0.220% 0.213% 1.033 
Egypt 0.342 0.659 0.026 0.658 66,371,670 43,655,589 492,274,359 1.231% 1.103% 1.116 
El Salvador 0.367 0.722 0.011 0.633 6,417,185 4,064,531 45,832,955 0.115% 0.107% 1.075 
Equatorial Guinea 0.330 0.655 0.006 0.670 481,880 322,673 3,638,564 0.009% 0.008% 1.136 
Eritrea 0.222 0.444 0.000 0.778 4,296,700 3,342,335 37,689,235 0.094% 0.071% 1.320 
Estonia 0.675 0.853 0.496 0.325 1,358,000 441,775 4,981,601 0.012% 0.023% 0.552 
Ethiopia 0.184 0.367 0.000 0.816 67,217,840 54,875,205 618,790,335 1.547% 1.117% 1.385 
Fiji 0.387 0.752 0.023 0.613 823,300 504,344 5,687,139 0.014% 0.014% 1.039 
-78- 
Finland 0.619 0.941 0.297 0.381 5,199,000 1,980,670 22,334,664 0.056% 0.086% 0.646 
France 0.644 0.938 0.351 0.356 59,485,000 21,150,042 238,494,622 0.596% 0.988% 0.603 
Gabon 0.337 0.635 0.040 0.663 1,315,418 871,714 9,829,727 0.025% 0.022% 1.124 
Gambia 0.236 0.47 0.002 0.764 1,388,568 1,060,676 11,960,523 0.030% 0.023% 1.296 
Georgia 0.394 0.732 0.056 0.606 4,616,000 2,796,902 31,538,757 0.079% 0.077% 1.028 
Germany 0.783 0.93 0.637 0.217 82,508,000 17,867,397 201,478,479 0.504% 1.371% 0.367 
Ghana 0.262 0.52 0.004 0.738 20,298,490 14,982,286 168,945,042 0.422% 0.337% 1.252 
Greece 0.525 0.912 0.138 0.475 11,005,000 5,229,247 58,966,660 0.147% 0.183% 0.806 
Grenada 0.404 0.787 0.022 0.596 103,500 61,654 695,230 0.002% 0.002% 1.011 
Guatemala 0.336 0.663 0.009 0.664 11,991,950 7,961,986 89,781,901 0.224% 0.199% 1.126 
Guinea 0.235 0.466 0.003 0.765 7,744,346 5,927,316 66,838,313 0.167% 0.129% 1.298 
Guinea-Bissau 0.175 0.348 0.002 0.825 1,446,881 1,193,567 13,459,044 0.034% 0.024% 1.399 
Guyana 0.389 0.72 0.057 0.611 765,592 468,065 5,278,050 0.013% 0.013% 1.037 
Haiti 0.239 0.475 0.002 0.761 8,286,491 6,309,681 71,149,983 0.178% 0.138% 1.292 
Honduras 0.338 0.667 0.009 0.662 6,796,528 4,500,902 50,753,609 0.127% 0.113% 1.123 
Hungary 0.566 0.862 0.270 0.434 10,159,000 4,410,782 49,737,390 0.124% 0.169% 0.737 
Iceland 0.580 0.956 0.205 0.420 288,000 120,844 1,362,678 0.003% 0.005% 0.712 
India 0.307 0.602 0.013 0.693 1,048,641,000 726,310,661 8,190,110,962 20.475% 17.426% 1.175 
Indonesia 0.355 0.697 0.014 0.645 211,816,800 136,540,686 1,539,676,378 3.849% 3.520% 1.094 
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 0.398 0.736 0.059 0.602 65,540,000 39,483,123 445,224,303 1.113% 1.089% 1.022 
Ireland 0.600 0.946 0.254 0.400 3,930,000 1,572,344 17,730,251 0.044% 0.065% 0.679 
Israel 0.520 0.915 0.124 0.480 6,566,000 3,154,548 35,571,695 0.089% 0.109% 0.815 
Italy 0.569 0.934 0.204 0.431 57,690,130 24,867,717 280,416,319 0.701% 0.959% 0.731 
Jamaica 0.406 0.738 0.073 0.594 2,621,043 1,557,600 17,563,994 0.044% 0.044% 1.008 
Japan 0.588 0.943 0.233 0.412 127,399,000 52,482,508 591,809,524 1.480% 2.117% 0.699 
Jordan 0.394 0.753 0.035 0.606 5,171,341 3,133,634 35,335,855 0.088% 0.086% 1.028 
Kazakhstan 0.613 0.761 0.466 0.387 14,875,000 5,751,087 64,851,089 0.162% 0.247% 0.656 
Kenya 0.240 0.474 0.005 0.760 31,344,580 23,837,148 268,795,297 0.672% 0.521% 1.290 
Kuwait 0.601 0.844 0.359 0.399 2,334,919 930,608 10,493,832 0.026% 0.039% 0.676 
Kyrgyzstan 0.380 0.702 0.059 0.620 5,003,900 3,100,833 34,965,983 0.087% 0.083% 1.051 
Lao People's Dem.  Rep. 0.273 0.545 0.001 0.727 5,530,092 4,020,537 45,336,855 0.113% 0.092% 1.233 
-79- 
Latvia 0.502 0.836 0.169 0.498 2,338,000 1,163,712 13,122,390 0.033% 0.039% 0.844 
Lebanon 0.405 0.759 0.051 0.595 4,441,245 2,642,105 29,793,221 0.074% 0.074% 1.009 
Lesotho 0.249 0.497 0.001 0.751 1,776,616 1,334,480 15,048,022 0.038% 0.030% 1.274 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0.456 0.799 0.114 0.544 5,448,226 2,961,984 33,400,281 0.084% 0.091% 0.922 
Lithuania 0.513 0.852 0.174 0.487 3,469,000 1,689,663 19,053,178 0.048% 0.058% 0.826 
Luxembourg 0.975 0.949 1.000 0.026 443,500 11,309 127,527 0.000% 0.007% 0.043 
Macedonia, TFYR 0.465 0.797 0.133 0.535 2,038,000 1,090,556 12,297,456 0.031% 0.034% 0.908 
Madagascar 0.250 0.499 0.001 0.750 16,437,220 12,324,113 138,970,635 0.347% 0.273% 1.272 
Malawi 0.203 0.404 0.001 0.797 10,743,330 8,566,579 96,599,484 0.241% 0.179% 1.353 
Malaysia 0.421 0.795 0.048 0.579 24,304,580 14,062,559 158,573,908 0.396% 0.404% 0.982 
Maldives 0.376 0.745 0.008 0.624 286,680 178,759 2,015,739 0.005% 0.005% 1.058 
Mali 0.167 0.333 0.000 0.833 11,373,720 9,477,789 106,874,572 0.267% 0.189% 1.414 
Malta 0.483 0.867 0.099 0.517 397,000 205,188 2,313,764 0.006% 0.007% 0.877 
Mauritania 0.245 0.477 0.012 0.755 2,784,686 2,103,311 23,717,602 0.059% 0.046% 1.281 
Mauritius 0.406 0.791 0.022 0.594 1,210,000 718,395 8,100,856 0.020% 0.020% 1.007 
Mexico 0.441 0.814 0.068 0.559 100,818,500 56,358,702 635,518,716 1.589% 1.675% 0.948 
Moldova, Rep. of 0.396 0.671 0.121 0.604 4,255,000 2,570,140 28,981,718 0.072% 0.071% 1.025 
Mongolia 0.377 0.679 0.074 0.623 2,448,509 1,526,135 17,209,181 0.043% 0.041% 1.057 
Morocco 0.323 0.631 0.015 0.677 29,640,540 20,066,515 226,276,434 0.566% 0.493% 1.148 
Mozambique 0.191 0.379 0.003 0.809 18,438,330 14,913,781 168,172,558 0.420% 0.306% 1.372 
Myanmar 0.291 0.578 0.003 0.709 48,786,370 34,607,580 390,246,122 0.976% 0.811% 1.203 
Namibia 0.316 0.627 0.004 0.684 1,984,653 1,358,099 15,314,354 0.038% 0.033% 1.161 
Nepal 0.263 0.526 0.000 0.737 24,124,750 17,775,643 200,443,829 0.501% 0.401% 1.250 
Netherlands 0.651 0.943 0.359 0.349 16,144,000 5,635,997 63,553,298 0.159% 0.268% 0.592 
New Zealand 0.570 0.933 0.207 0.430 3,939,100 1,693,776 19,099,562 0.048% 0.065% 0.729 
Nicaragua 0.350 0.69 0.011 0.650 5,342,000 3,470,946 39,139,492 0.098% 0.089% 1.102 
Niger 0.141 0.281 0.001 0.859 11,425,340 9,813,877 110,664,416 0.277% 0.190% 1.457 
Nigeria 0.229 0.453 0.005 0.771 133,189,700 102,669,103 1,157,729,588 2.894% 2.213% 1.308 
Norway 0.606 0.963 0.249 0.394 4,538,000 1,786,854 20,149,140 0.050% 0.075% 0.668 
Oman 0.422 0.781 0.063 0.578 2,538,000 1,467,301 16,545,757 0.041% 0.042% 0.981 
Pakistan 0.268 0.527 0.008 0.732 144,902,400 106,132,029 1,196,778,648 2.992% 2.408% 1.243 
-80- 
Panama 0.419 0.804 0.034 0.581 2,940,414 1,708,598 19,266,699 0.048% 0.049% 0.986 
Papua New Guinea 0.266 0.523 0.008 0.734 5,378,120 3,949,126 44,531,607 0.111% 0.089% 1.246 
Paraguay 0.381 0.755 0.008 0.619 5,510,000 3,408,260 38,432,630 0.096% 0.092% 1.049 
Peru 0.393 0.762 0.024 0.607 26,749,000 16,233,706 183,056,456 0.458% 0.445% 1.030 
Philippines 0.385 0.758 0.013 0.615 79,944,220 49,140,573 554,124,792 1.385% 1.328% 1.043 
Poland 0.628 0.858 0.398 0.372 38,232,000 14,222,733 160,380,085 0.401% 0.635% 0.631 
Portugal 0.500 0.904 0.096 0.500 10,368,000 5,184,064 58,457,158 0.146% 0.172% 0.848 
Qatar 0.710 0.849 0.572 0.290 610,487 176,848 1,994,200 0.005% 0.010% 0.491 
Romania 0.505 0.792 0.219 0.495 21,803,000 10,782,083 121,582,210 0.304% 0.362% 0.839 
Russian Federation 0.612 0.795 0.430 0.388 144,070,800 55,837,369 629,640,007 1.574% 2.394% 0.657 
Rwanda 0.225 0.45 0.001 0.775 8,163,000 6,324,284 71,314,641 0.178% 0.136% 1.314 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.433 0.834 0.032 0.567 46,710 26,495 298,771 0.001% 0.001% 0.962 
Saint Lucia 0.397 0.772 0.022 0.603 159,133 95,960 1,082,076 0.003% 0.003% 1.023 
Saint Vincent  0.385 0.755 0.015 0.615 109,164 67,147 757,170 0.002% 0.002% 1.043 
Samoa (Western) 0.395 0.776 0.013 0.605 176,200 106,653 1,202,650 0.003% 0.003% 1.027 
São Tomé and Principe 0.306 0.604 0.008 0.694 154,200 107,051 1,207,138 0.003% 0.003% 1.178 
Saudi Arabia 0.450 0.772 0.127 0.550 21,885,970 12,045,208 135,825,615 0.340% 0.364% 0.934 
Senegal 0.232 0.458 0.006 0.768 10,007,000 7,687,502 86,686,733 0.217% 0.166% 1.303 
Seychelles 0.428 0.821 0.034 0.572 82,436 47,182 532,044 0.001% 0.001% 0.971 
Sierra Leone 0.150 0.298 0.003 0.850 5,235,472 4,448,511 50,162,827 0.125% 0.087% 1.441 
Singapore 0.526 0.907 0.145 0.474 4,164,000 1,972,946 22,247,573 0.056% 0.069% 0.804 
Slovakia 0.636 0.849 0.422 0.364 5,379,000 1,960,449 22,106,647 0.055% 0.089% 0.618 
Slovenia 0.545 0.904 0.186 0.455 1,994,000 907,141 10,229,209 0.026% 0.033% 0.772 
Solomon Islands 0.300 0.594 0.006 0.700 443,296 310,253 3,498,512 0.009% 0.007% 1.187 
South Africa 0.420 0.658 0.183 0.580 45,345,290 26,281,783 296,361,783 0.741% 0.754% 0.983 
Spain 0.540 0.928 0.152 0.460 40,917,300 18,822,993 212,254,084 0.531% 0.680% 0.780 
Sri Lanka 0.379 0.751 0.007 0.621 19,007,000 11,804,648 133,112,981 0.333% 0.316% 1.054 
Sudan 0.258 0.512 0.003 0.742 32,790,850 24,344,335 274,514,495 0.686% 0.545% 1.259 
Suriname 0.439 0.755 0.122 0.561 433,456 243,303 2,743,561 0.007% 0.007% 0.952 
Swaziland 0.253 0.498 0.008 0.747 1,088,176 812,661 9,163,825 0.023% 0.018% 1.267 
Sweden 0.633 0.949 0.317 0.367 8,924,000 3,276,016 36,941,407 0.092% 0.148% 0.623 
-81- 
Switzerland 0.581 0.947 0.215 0.419 7,290,000 3,054,289 34,441,135 0.086% 0.121% 0.711 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.378 0.721 0.035 0.622 16,985,660 10,564,267 119,126,043 0.298% 0.282% 1.055 
Tajikistan 0.355 0.652 0.058 0.645 6,293,000 4,058,106 45,760,497 0.114% 0.105% 1.094 
Tanzania, U. Rep. of 0.210 0.418 0.001 0.790 35,181,300 27,804,873 313,536,630 0.784% 0.585% 1.341 
Thailand 0.401 0.778 0.025 0.599 61,612,840 36,887,469 415,954,875 1.040% 1.024% 1.016 
Togo 0.257 0.512 0.002 0.743 4,759,539 3,535,376 39,866,032 0.100% 0.079% 1.260 
Tonga 0.412 0.81 0.014 0.588 101,163 59,484 670,756 0.002% 0.002% 0.998 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.535 0.801 0.270 0.465 1,303,976 605,798 6,831,173 0.017% 0.022% 0.788 
Tunisia 0.390 0.753 0.028 0.610 9,781,000 5,962,381 67,233,713 0.168% 0.163% 1.034 
Turkey 0.396 0.75 0.042 0.604 69,626,000 42,057,738 474,256,483 1.186% 1.157% 1.025 
Turkmenistan 0.489 0.738 0.241 0.511 4,792,900 2,447,746 27,601,569 0.069% 0.080% 0.866 
Uganda 0.254 0.508 0.001 0.746 24,600,000 18,344,504 206,858,485 0.517% 0.409% 1.265 
Ukraine 0.558 0.766 0.351 0.442 48,717,300 21,508,946 242,541,749 0.606% 0.810% 0.749 
United Arab Emirates 0.515 0.849 0.181 0.485 3,754,000 1,820,058 20,523,551 0.051% 0.062% 0.822 
United Kingdom 0.839 0.939 0.738 0.161 59,229,000 9,558,706 107,787,026 0.269% 0.984% 0.274 
United States 0.837 0.944 0.730 0.163 288,369,000 47,024,900 530,267,785 1.326% 4.792% 0.277 
Uruguay 0.447 0.84 0.055 0.553 3,361,000 1,857,446 20,945,156 0.052% 0.056% 0.938 
Uzbekistan 0.426 0.694 0.157 0.574 25,271,000 14,511,912 163,640,955 0.409% 0.420% 0.974 
Vanuatu 0.334 0.659 0.008 0.666 205,573 137,005 1,544,911 0.004% 0.003% 1.131 
Venezuela 0.448 0.772 0.123 0.552 25,220,000 13,929,100 157,068,983 0.393% 0.419% 0.937 
Viet Nam 0.356 0.704 0.008 0.644 80,423,990 51,794,278 584,048,821 1.460% 1.336% 1.093 
Yemen 0.249 0.489 0.009 0.751 18,600,920 13,970,687 157,537,929 0.394% 0.309% 1.274 
Zambia 0.203 0.394 0.012 0.797 10,244,420 8,165,701 92,079,050 0.230% 0.170% 1.352 
Zimbabwe 0.268 0.505 0.030 0.732 13,000,970 9,522,402 107,377,645 0.268% 0.216% 1.243 
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